Europe’s political leaders are getting increasingly desperate, especially since the European Central Bank’s aggressively expansionary monetary policy is proving ineffective. The more money the ECB prints, the worse the euro-zone economy performs.
The desperation is now at such a level that even the president of the ECB, Mario Draghi, is calling for EU governments to start big spending programs. Writes Benjamin Fox at EU Observer:
The European Central Bank (ECB) is preparing to step up its attempts to breathe life into the eurozone’s stagnant economy. During a speech in the US on Friday (22 August), ECB chief Mario Draghi called on eurozone treasuries to take fresh steps to stimulate demand amid signs that the bloc’s tepid recovery is stalling. “It may be useful to have a discussion on the overall fiscal stance of the euro area,” Draghi told delegates at a meeting of financiers in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, adding that governments should shift towards “a more growth-friendly overall fiscal stance.” “The risks of ‘doing too little’…outweigh those of ‘doing too much’”, he added.
Some trivia first. If you want to be rich, you have a condo on Manhattan. If you actually are rich, you have an oceanfront property in West Palm Beach. If you are genuinely wealthy you have a second home in Jackson Hole. The only people who live in Jackson Hole permanently are dyed-in-the-wool Wyomingites like former Vice President Dick Cheney (a very nice man whom I have had the honor of meeting a couple of times). It is a cold place with short, mildly warm summers and long, unforgiving winters. It is also breathtakingly beautiful.
Now for the real story… There is no doubt that Draghi is beyond worried. He should be: his monetary policy is useless. Europe is in the liquidity trap, and the European Central Bank’s expansionist monetary policy is part of the reason for this. For almost a year now Draghi has pushed the ECB to arrogantly violate the principles upon which the Bank was founded. He has printed money at a pace that by comparison almost makes Ben Bernanke look like a monetarist scrooge. More importantly, the ECB has de facto bailed out euro-zone countries even though that is very much against the statutes upon which the bank was founded. They have pushed interest rates through the floor, punishing banks for overnight lending to the bank, and they have a formal Quantitative Easing program in their back pocket.
Furthermore, the ECB was an active party in the austerity programs designed to save Europe’s welfare states in the midst of the crisis. Those programs exacerbated the crisis by suppressing activity in the private sector in order to make the welfare states look fiscally sustainable. Now Draghi is asking the same governments that he helped bully into austerity to stop trying to save their welfare states and instead be concerned with GDP growth.
Superficially this sounds like an opening toward a fiscal policy that uses private-sector metrics to measure its success. However, it is highly doubtful that Draghi and, especially, the governments of the EU’s member states, would be ready to actually do what is needed to get the European economy growing again. The first part of such a strategy would be to a combination of tax cuts and reforms to reduce and eventually eliminate the massive, redistributive entitlement programs that constitute Europe’s welfare states.
The second thing needed is a monetary policy that does not provide those same welfare states with a large supply of liquidity. The more cheap money welfare states have access to, the less inclined their governments are going to be to want to reform away their entitlement programs. On the contrary, they are going to want to preserve those programs as best they can.
Therefore, the last thing the ECB wants to do right now is to launch a QE program. Which, as the EU Observer story reports, is exactly what the ECB has in mind:
The Frankfurt-based bank is preparing to belatedly follow the lead of the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England by launching its own programme of quantitative easing (QE) – creating money to buy financial assets.
This comes on the heels of the Bank’s new policy to increase credit supply to commercial banks on the condition that they in turn increase lending to non-financial corporations. The bizarre part of this is that in an economy that is stagnant at best, contracting at worst, there is no demand for more credit among non-financial corporations. It really does not matter if banks throw money after manufacturers, trucking companies, real estate developers… they are not going to expand their businesses unless there is someone there to buy their goods and services. If there is no buyer out there, why waste time and money on producing the product – and why take on debt to do it?
I have reported in numerous articles recently on how the European economy is not going anywhere. Growth is anemic with a negative outlook. Unemployment is stuck at almost twice the U.S. level and the overall fiscal situation of EU member states has not improved one iota despite more than three years of harsh, welfare-state saving austerity.
As yet more evidence of a stagnant Europe, Eurostat’s flash inflation estimate for August says prices increased by 0.3 percent on an annual basis. This is a further weakening of inflation and reinforces my point that unless the European economy starts moving again, it will find itself in actual deflation very soon. But the macroeconomic consequences of deflation set in earlier than formal deflation, as economic agents build it into their expectations. It looks very much as if that has now happened.
Deflation is dangerous, but it is not a problem in itself. It is a very serious symptom of an economy in depression. It is important to follow the causal chain backward and understand how the macroeconomic system brings about deflation. This blog provides that analysis; very few others attempt to do so. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard over at the good British newspaper Guardian has demonstrated good insight, and a recent article by David Brady and Michael Spence of the Hoover Institution provided some very important perspectives. But so far insights about the systemic nature of the crisis are not very widely spread.
The only advice being dispensed with some consistency is, as mentioned, the one about more government spending. Dan Steinbock of the India, China and America Institute is an example of the growing choir behind that idea. He does so, however, in a somewhat convoluted fashion. In an opinion piece for the EU Observer he discusses the macroeconomic differences between Europe and America, though in a fashion that almost makes you believe he is a regular reader of this blog:
Half a decade after the financial crisis, the United States is recovering, but Europe is suffering a lost decade. Why? In the second quarter, the US economy grew at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 4 percent, surpassing expectations. In the same time period, economic growth in the eurozone slowed to a halt (0.2%), well before the impact of the sanctions imposed on and by Russia over Ukraine. Germany’s economy contracted (-0.6%). France’s continued to stagnate (-0.1%) and Italy’s took a dive (-0.8%). How did this new status quo come about?
He is correct about the American economy widening its gap vs. Europe, he is correct about the Italian economy, about the French economy, and about the stagnant nature of the euro-zone economy. What he does not get right is his answer to the question why the European economy has once again ground to a halt:
[In] the eurozone, real GDP growth contracted last year and shrank in the ongoing second quarter, while inflation plunged to a 4.5 year low. Europe’s core economies performed dismally. In Germany, foreign trade and investment were the weak spots. The country could still achieve close to 2 percent growth in 2014-2016 until growth is likely to decelerate to 1.5 percent by late decade. In France, President Francois Hollande has already pledged €30 billion in tax breaks and hopes to cut public spending by €50 billion by 2017. Nevertheless, French growth stayed in 0.1-0.2 percent in the 1st quarter.
Then Steinbock proceeds to make a brave attempt to explain the depth of the European economic crisis:
Fiscal austerity and falling consumer confidence are preventing domestic demand from rebounding, while investment and jobs linger in the private sector. Pierre Gattaz, head of the largest employers union in France, has called the economic situation “catastrophic.” As France is at a standstill, Paris has all but scrapped the target to shrink its deficit. … The new stance is to avoid an explicit confrontation with Germany, but to redefine austerity vis-à-vis budgetary reforms.
It is unclear what Steinbock means by this. He appears to miss the point that there are two kinds of austerity: that which aims to save government and that which aims to grow the private sector. The two are mutually exclusive, both in theory and in practice. One might suspect that Steinbock refers to the government-first version, since that is the prevailing version in Europe. However, that makes it even more unclear what Steinbock has in mind when he talks about “budgetary reforms” – an educated guess would be the relaxation of the Stability and Growth Pact so that the French government, among others, can spend more frivolously.
Such a relaxation would not contribute anything for the better. All it would do is open for more government spending. Steinbock does not make entirely clear whether or not he recommends more government spending. His article, however, seems to lean in favor of that, and I strongly disagree with him on that point for reasons I have explained on many occasions. Let’s just summarize by noting that if Europe is going to replace government-first austerity with government-first spending, then it opens up an entirely new dimension of the continent’s crisis. That dimension is in itself so ominous it requires its own detailed analysis.
Europe’s version of austerity has been designed exclusively to save the continent’s big welfare states in very tough economic times. By raising taxes and cutting spending, governments in Greece, Spain, Italy and other EU member states have hoped to make their welfare states more slim-fit and compatible with a smaller tax base. The metric they have used for their austerity policies is not that the private sector would grow as a result – on the contrary, private-sector activity has been of no concern under government-first austerity. Unemployment has skyrocketed, private-sector activity has plummeted and Europe is in worse shape today than it was in 2011, right before the Great Big Austerity Purge of 2012.
The criticism of austerity was massive, but not in the legitimate form we would expect: instead of pointing to the complete neglect of private-sector activity, Europe’s austerity critics have focused entirely on the spending cuts to entitlement programs. While such cuts are necessary for Europe’s future, they cannot be executed in a panic-style fashion – they should be structural and remove, not shrink, spending programs. Furthermore, they cannot be combined with tax hikes: when you take away people’s entitlements you need to cut, not raise, taxes so they can afford to replace the entitlements with private-funded solutions. Tax hikes, needless to say, drain dry the private sector and exacerbate the recession that produced the need for austerity in the first place.
This is a very simple analysis of what is going on in Europe. It is simple yet accurate: my predictions throughout 2012, 2013 and so far through 2014 have been that there will be no recovery in Europe unless and until they replace government-first austerity with private-sector austerity. This means, plain and simple, that you stop using government-saving metrics as measurement of austerity success and instead focus on the growth of the private sector. This will rule out tax hikes and dictate very different types of spending cuts, namely those that permanently terminate government spending programs.
Unfortunately, this aspect of austerity is absent in Europe. All that is heard is criticism from socialists who want to keep the tax hikes but combine them with more government spending. A continuation, in other words, of what originally caused the current economic crisis (that’s right – it was not a financial crisis). These socialists won big in the French elections two years ago, gaining both the Elysee Palace and a majority in the national parliament. However, faced with the harsh economic realities of the Great Recession, they soon found that spending-as-usual was not a very good idea. At the same time, they have rightly seen the problems with the kind of government-first austerity that has been common fiscal practice in Europe. Now that their own agenda is proving to be as destructive as government-first austerity, France’s socialists do not know which way to turn anymore. This has led to a political crisis of surprisingly large proportions. Reports the EU Observer:
French Prime Minister Manuel Valls on Monday (25 August) tendered his government’s resignation after more leftist ministers voiced criticism to what is being perceived as German-imposed austerity. The embattled French President, Francois Hollande, whose popularity ratings are only 17 percent, accepted the resignation and tasked Valls to form a new cabinet by Tuesday, the Elysee palace said in a press release. “The head of state has asked him [Valls] to form a team in line with the orientation he has defined for our country,” the statement added – a reference to further budget cuts needed for France to rein in its public deficit.
From the perspective of the European Union, France has been the bad boy in the classroom, not getting with the government-first austerity programs that have worked so well in Greece (lost one fifth of its GDP) and Spain (second highest youth unemployment in the EU). Hollande’s main problem is that by not getting his economy back growing again he is jeopardizing the future of the euro, in two ways. First, perpetual stagnation with zero GDP growth has forced the European Central Bank into a reckless money-supply policy with negative interest rates on bank deposits and a de facto endless commitment to printing money. This alone is reason for the euro to sink, and the only remedy would be that the economies of the euro zone started growing again. Secondly, by exacerbating the recession in France, and by failing endemically to deliver on his promises of more growth and more jobs, Hollande is setting himself up to lose the 2017 presidential election to Marine Le Pen. First on her agenda is to pull France out of the euro; if the zone loses its second-biggest economy, what reasons are there for smaller economies like Greece to stay?
This is why he has now shifted policy foot, from the spending-as-usual strategy of 2012 to government-first austerity. But since neither is good for the private sector, frustration is rising within the ranks of France’s socialists to a point where it could cause a crippling political crisis. Euractiv again:
The rebel minister, Arnaud Montebourg, who had held the economy portfolio until Monday, over the weekend criticised his Socialist government for being too German-friendly. “France is a free country which shouldn’t be aligning itself with the obsessions of the German right,” he said at a Socialist rally on Sunday, urging a “just and sane resistance”. The day before, he gave an interview to Le Monde in which he claimed that Germany had “imposed” a policy of austerity across Europe and that other countries should speak out against it. Two more ministers, Benoit Hamon in charge of education and culture minister Aurelie Fillipetti, also rallied around Montebourg and said they will not seek a post in the new cabinet. In a resignation letter addressed to Hollande and Valls, Fillipetti accused them of betraying their voters and abandoning left-wing policies, at a time when the populist National Front is gaining ground everywhere. According to Le Parisien, Valls forced Hollande to let go of Montebourg by telling him “it’s either him or me.”
Ironically, the main difference between the socialist economic policies and those of the National Front is that the latter want to reintroduce the franc while the former want to stay with the euro. Other than that, the National Front wants to preserve the welfare state, though significantly cut down on the number of non-Europeans who are allowed to benefit from it. The socialists also want to preserve the welfare state, but also open the door for more non-European immigration.
In short, the differences between socialist and nationalist economic policy is limited to nuances. Needless to say, neither will help France back to growth and prosperity.
Meanwhile, according to the Euractiv story there is mounting pressure from outside France on President Hollande to stick with the government-first austerity program:
[The] government turmoil is also a sign of diverging views on how to tackle the country’s economic woes. French unemployment is at nearly 11 percent and growth in 2014 is forecast to be of only 0.5 percent. Meanwhile, French officials have already said the deficit will again surpass EU’s 3 percent target, and are negotiating another delay with the European Commission. The commission declined to comment on the new developments in France, with a spokeswoman saying they are “aware” and “in contact” with the French government. German chancellor Angela Merkel on Monday during a visit to Spain declined to comment directly about the change in government, but said she wishes “the French president success with his reform agenda.” Both Merkel and Spanish PM Mariano Rajoy defended the need for further austerity and economic reforms, saying this boosted economic growth.
Growth – where? What growth is he talking about? But more important than the erroneous statement that the European economy is benefiting from attempts to save the welfare state, France is now becoming the focal point of more than just the future of the current European version of austerity. The struggle between socialists and competing brands of statism is a concentrate of a more general political trend in Europe. The way France goes, the way Europe will go. While the outcome of the statist competition will make a difference to immigration policy, it won’t change the general course of the economy. Both factions, nationalists and socialists, want to keep the welfare state and therefore preserve the very cause of Europe’s economic stagnation (which by the way is now in its sixth year).
Europe needs a libertarian renaissance. Its entrepreneurs, investors and workers need to stand up together and say “Laissez-nous faire!” with one voice. Then, and only then, will they elevate Europe back to where she belongs, namely at the top of the world’s prosperity league.
When do you stop talking about an economy as being in a recession, and when do you start talking about it as being in a state of permanent stagnation? How many years of microscopic growth does it take before economic stagnation becomes the new normal to people?
Since 2012 I have said that Europe is in a state of permanent economic stagnation. So far I am the only one making that analysis, but hopefully my new book will change that. After all, the real world economy provide pieces of evidence almost on a daily basis, showing that I am right. Today, e.g., the EU Observer explains:
France has all but abandoned a target to shrink its deficit, as the eurozone endured a turbulent day that raised the prospect of a triple-dip recession. Figures published by Eurostat on Thursday (14 August) indicated that the eurozone economy flatlined between April and June, while the EU-28 saw 0.2 percent growth.
I reported on this last week. These numbers are not surprising: the European economy simply has no reason to recover.
The EU Observer again:
Germany, France, and Italy … account for around two thirds of the eurozone’s output. Germany’s output fell by 0.2 percent, the same as Italy, which announced its second quarter figures last week. France recorded zero growth for the second successive quarter, while finance minister Michel Sapin suggested that the country’s deficit would exceed 4 percent this year, missing its European Commission-sanctioned 3.8 percent target.
And that target is a step back from the Stability and Growth Pact, which stipulated a deficit cap of three percent of GDP. It also puts a 60-percent-of-GDP cap on government debt, but that part seems to have been forgotten a long, long time ago.
What is really going on here is a slow but steady erosion of the Stability and Growth Pact. Over the past 6-8 months there have been a number of “suggestions” circulating the European political scene, about abolishing or at least comprehensively reforming the Pact. The general idea is that the Pact is getting in the way of government spending, needed to pull the European economy out of the recession.
No such government spending is needed. The European economy is standing still not because there is too little government spending, but because there is too much. I do not believe, however, that this insight will penetrate the policy-making circles of the European Union any time soon.
Back to the EU Observer:
In an article in Le Monde on Thursday (14 August), [French finance minister] Sapin abandoned the target, commenting that “It is better to admit what is than to hope for what won’t be.” France would cut its deficit “at an appropriate pace,” he added in a radio interview with Europe 1. … Sapin’s admission is another setback for beleaguered President Francois Hollande, who made hitting the 3 percent deficit target spelt out in the EU’s stability and growth pact by 2013 one of his key election pledges in 2012. Paris has now revised down its growth forecast from 1 percent to 0.5 percent over the whole of 2014, and cut its projection for 2015 to 1 percent from 1.7 percent.
Let me make this point again: instead of asking when the European economy is going to get back to growth again, it is time to ask if the European economy has any reason at all to get back to growth. As I explain in my new book, there is no such reason so long as the welfare state remains in place.
From a macroeconomic viewpoint Illinois is one of the worst-performing U.S. states. A big reason is the high taxes, by U.S. comparison, that drive jobs and businesses to other states. Illinois has raised its taxes more times than I care to count, with a “temporary” income-tax increase in 2011 that (huge surprise) has turned out to be permanent. States neighboring Illinois have been quick to capitalize on The Prairie State’s suicidal tax policy, with some crafty people in Indiana putting up this billboard at the state line:
The image is not mine. It was the thumbnail for a policy paper by the Illinois Policy Institute, a hard-working free-market think tank in Chicago. I chose to borrow it because it illustrates the campaign by Indiana to attract tax-weary Illinoisans. In doing so, Indiana participates in one of the most important economic activities of our time: tax competition. Since there is completely free movement of people and capital across state lines in the United States, the decisions by families and businesses where to reside and work is governed to a relatively large degree by factors such as the tax burden. High-tax states (count Illinois among them) lose jobs and investments to low-tax states.
Politicians who want to build big governments can then sell their welfare states to taxpayers as best they can – if taxpayers prefer to keep more of their own money, and pay for more of their own consumption directly out of their own pocket, then they can choose to do so.
Tax competition fulfills two major purposes. (For an excellent introduction to tax competition, please visit this site over at Center for Freedom and Prosperity.) The first purpose is to keep the free-market sector of the economy alive. When people make decisions to move, look for jobs or invest based in part on differences in taxation, it keeps us as economic agents on alert. We do not slouch on the job, we watch for better opportunities and thereby take responsibility for ourselves and those who depend on us.
The second purpose is to put a cap on the growth, and ideally size, of government. If people can vote with their feet – or money – then government will at some point have to reconsider its plans to expand with yet more tax hikes.
Which explains why there is such widespread contempt for tax competition among lawmakers, both in the United States and in Europe. The latest expression of that contempt comes from (another huge surprise) France, where socialist politicians want to do away with tax competition altogether, at least within the EU. Reports Euractiv:
Paris has long backed the idea of an across-the-board harmonisation of EU member states’ tax systems. According to French government advisors, this must begin by a common tax base for the European banking sector, EurActiv France reports. … Those in favour of harmonisation have a mountain to climb, but have not backed away from the challenge.
Fortunately, there is still a shred of common sense to be shared among some in Europe:
Experts across Europe oppose a common tax system on the basis that competition between tax systems is positive and forces governments to be more efficient.
This, however, has not prevented government expansionists from making the most absurd arguments for abolishing tax competition. Euractiv again:
France has one of the highest levels of income tax in Europe and the government argues that low tax rates prevent the smooth working of the European Common Market. Earlier this year French President François Hollande said he wanted “harmonisation with our largest neighbours by 2020.” In a report titled Tax Harmonisation in Europe: Moving Forward, the [French government's economic advisory council] CAE proposed three ways to tackle the negative effects of fiscal competition.
The very idea that low tax rates prevent “the smooth working” of the free market in the EU is patently absurd. The argument is based on the notion that when tax rates are the same everywhere, businesses make decisions based not on taxes but on “real” business matters. But that notion disregards the fact that government is an active player in the economy, and that its services – while provided inefficiently under a coercion-based monopoly – are like most other services in the economy. I can choose to buy tax-paid services from the New York state government, or from the state of Wyoming, just as I can choose to bank with Warren Federal Credit Union or First Interstate Bank, or to buy my insurance products from Farmers, GEICO or any other insurance company.
Since government is an active player in our economy, it must be subjected to the same free-market conditions as the rest of us, as far as that is possible.
However, as we go back to the Euractiv piece we learn that this is not a concept that European statists are willing to entertain:
The first measure is to continue efforts for a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB). Harmonising tax systems would make “fiscal competition more transparent and healthier,” says Agnès Bénassy-Quéré. According to Alain Trannoy, an economist who co-wrote the report, a CCCTB should be based on “reinforced cooperation or with some countries like Germany, France, the Benelux states and Italy, in order to create a snowball effect in different Eurozone countries.” Harmonising tax bases would also reduce the risks of optimisation, when multinationals transfer their revenues from one country to another in order to benefit from lower corporate tax. “Corporate tax is an important element, but there is no point if tax bases are not harmonised,” said Alain Trannoy.
And now for the three-dollar bill question: once these high-tax EU states succeed in creating a high-tax cartel, what is going to happen with the tax rates?
a) They will go up,
b) They will go up, or
c) They will go up.
You may choose whichever answer you want, so long as your choice is harmonized with the answers you do not choose.
According to the authors, the Banking Union, which was adopted in April, needs to go further in the area of taxation. This can be done with a Single Financial Activity Tax (FAT) in Europe. They also advocate a minimum corporate income tax for the banking sector, the receipts of which should be reinvested into infrastructure and long term investments and “form the first building block of a euro area budget.”
And there you have it. The real purpose behind this is to build yet another level of government spending. While it sounds noble to invest in “infrastructure” and the like, this is, after all Europe. Therefore, it is a safe bet to foresee that if this new level of government were ever to be created, its spending would go primarily toward yet more entitlement programs in an even more complex welfare state. Let’s keep in mind that there are already politicians on the left flank of European politics who are pushing hard for harmonized entitlement programs across the EU. What better venue for that harmonization than a full-fledged, EU-level welfare state?
And as we all immediately understand, the world’s largest welfare state, which has not solved all the alleged problems of inequality and poverty it was created to solve, must therefore obviously become a lot bigger.
Out there, on the outer left rim of unabridged statism, the question “when is government big enough?” simply does not have an answer. With the next EU Commissioner for Economic Affairs likely being a socialist, this unanswered question is going to have serious consequences for Europe. Its current journey into industrial poverty, paved by the world’s most sloth-inducing entitlement systems and fueled by the world’s highest taxes, apparently is not going fast enough.
In last week’s elections, did Europe’s voters plant the seeds of a post-EU Europe? The question has surfaced in response to the strong showing of Euroskeptics and outright anti-EU parties across the continent. While most observers of European politics are still at loss trying to comprehend the fact that some of their fellow citizens actually don’t like the EU, some sharp-minded analysts see the writing on the wall for what it actually is. In addition to Yours Truly, you can always trust Daily Telegraph columnist Ambrose Evans-Pritchard. Again, he has elevated himself above the murmur. Starting with Britain, he gradually expands his perspective, laying out a credible scenario for Europe’s future:
If Europe’s policy elites could not quite believe it before, they must now know beyond much doubt that they have lost Britain. This island is no longer part of the European project in any meaningful sense. British defenders of the status quo were knouted on Sunday. UKIP won 27.5pc of the vote … Margaret Thatcher’s Tory children are scarcely more friendly to the EU enterprise.
This is an important observation. The British vote shows two things: first, that British democracy, unlike continental Europe’s, still has not succumbed to Europhoristic centralism – on the contrary, Brits still believe in their traditions and their way of governing themselves; secondly, classical Anglo-Saxian liberalism still has a voice in Britain.
The second point carries more weight than perhaps even the Brits themselves realize. Deep down, UKIP’s ideology is a mild version of what we here in America refer to as “libertarianism”, namely a solid refutation of all government beyond a small set of strictly contained and enumerated core functions. A UKIP prime minister would never pursue the termination of the British welfare state, but he would most likely revive some of Thatcher’s legacy, a legacy that has been carefully squandered by the Conservatives.
Britain needs more Thatcherism. Europe could use a big dose of it as well. Hopefully, an invigorated UKIP can deliver that, with the right cooperation in the European Parliament.
Back to Evans-Pritchard:
Britain’s decision to stay out of monetary union at Maastricht sowed the seeds of separation, as pro-Europeans fully understood at the time, though almost nobody expected EMU officialdom to clinch the argument so emphatically by running the currency bloc into the ground with 1930s Gold Standard policies and youth unemployment levels above 50pc in Spain and Greece, and above 40pc in Italy. European leaders must henceforth calculate that the British people will vote to leave the EU altogether unless offered an entirely new dispensation: tariff-free access to the single market along the lines already enjoyed by Turkey or Tunisia; and deliverance from half the Acquis Communautaire, that 170,000-page edifice of directives and regulations that drains away sovereignty, and is never repealed.
In a nutshell, Evans-Pritchard is saying that the euro was doomed without Britain’s participation – a statement that is only partially correct. The structural imbalance of the euro project goes deeper than that. But more on that later. Evans-Pritchard refers to reckless austerity policies as having removed the fiscal and, especially, monetary policy foundations for a sound, strong common currency. He is right about austerity, as regular readers of this blog know; the Liberty Bullhorn contains more analysis of Europe’s austerity policies and their consequences than any other website in the world.
But even if we disregard the structural imbalances built into the euro project, it is important to note that the ECB has exacerbated the crisis by frivolously printing money right, left, up and down to save credit-crashing welfare states from fiscal ruin. If there is one single policy move that really drove the pole through the heart of the euro, it was the ECB’s decision to bail out its worst-rated welfare states. That open-ended commitment to print money reduced the euro from Deutsch Mark status to something of a business-class Drakhma.
Evans-Pritchard also makes a note of the ever-growing regulatory burden on EU’s member states. In this category, the EU is competing with the Obama administration, though in the latter case things have slowed down considerably in the last couple of years. Also, it is increasingly likely that the next president of the United States will have libertarian roots – probably stronger than those of UKIP leader Nigel Farage – which will vouch for a historic regulatory rollback. For that to happen in Britain, the country has to leave the EU.
Which, again, is probably going to happen in the next few years. Now for the broader perspective, and Evans-Pritchard’s analysis of where France is heading:
It is a fair bet that EU leaders would search for an amicable formula, letting Britain go its own way while remaining a semi-detached or merely titular member of the EU. Let us call it the Holy Roman Empire solution. Yet Britain is the least of their problems. The much greater shock is the “Seisme” in France, as Le Figaro calls it, where Marine Le Pen’s Front National swept 73 electoral departments, while President Francois Hollande’s socialists were reduced to two. … It is widely claimed that the Front is eurosceptic only on the surface. Perhaps, but when I asked Mrs. Le Pen what she would do no her first day in office if she ever reached the Elysee Palace, her reply was trenchant. She would instruct the French Treasury to draft plans for the immediate restoration of the franc… She vowed to confront Europe’s leaders with a stark choice at their first meeting: either to work with France for a “sortie concertee” or coordinated EMU break-up, or resist and let “financial Armageddon” run its course. … She said there can be no compromise with monetary union, deeming it impossible to remain a self-governing nation within the structures of EMU, and impossible to carry out the reflation policies necessary to defeat the economic slump.
Given that the Front National has suffered no notable setback in national voter support over the past decade, but instead gradually grown stronger, the prospect of a Madame President Le Pen is one that both Europe and the United States should get used to. Therefore, as Evans-Pritchard rightly explains, it is also time to get used to the prospect of Europe returning to national currencies.
The one point in this that I disagree with is that reflation is the way out of the recession. More on that in a moment. First, one more point from Evans-Pritchard, this one about the future of the euro with rising Euro-skepticism among voters:
The euro will inevitably lurch from crisis to crisis without some form of fiscal union and debt pooling. Yet voters have just let forth a primordial scream against any further transfers of power.
Indeed. So long as there is any form of government involved in the economy, there has to be a fiscal policy tied to that currency. Furthermore, so long as there is a welfare state there will be government deficits, either in recessions or on a structural basis as has been the case in Europe and the United States for decades now. Such deficits will be denominated in a currency, and that currency has to be the same that the government accepts for, e.g., tax payments, as well as the same currency that they use to pay out entitlements. In other words, there has to be a jurisdictional overlap between a currency and a fiscal government, or else the currency inevitably becomes unstable.
Some of these points were made by economists, among them Robert Mundell, already 15 years ago, before the euro was minted. However, they were drowned out by the Europhoria that dominated most of the ’90s in Europe, leaving the continent with a fundamentally unsustainable imbalance between monetary and fiscal policy.
So long as national government deficits were of manageable levels the imbalance did not have any notable political or macroeconomic consequences. As I describe in my forthcoming book Industrial Poverty, this was the case between the Millennium and Great Recessions. However, as soon as budgetary sink holes opened up around Europe from 2008 and on, the imbalance became a true problem.
The full explanation of this requires an intricate but fascinating macroeconomic analysis. I am working on it separately, hoping to share it later this year. In the meantime, let’s acknowledge that Evans-Pritchard hits it right on the nail: the mounting voter resistance to more EU power is a game changer for both the EU and the future of the euro currency. What is missing from his column is the right economic conclusion, namely that dismantling the welfare state – not reflation – is the way forward for Europe. But that is a minor point. Do take a moment and read the rest of his entertaining yet sharply analytical column.
As the dust settles on the elections to the European Parliament, a somewhat schizophrenic conclusion is emerging:
- on the one hand voters expressed their skepticism toward the EU project and rejected, overall, the notion of a continuous, business-as-usual expansion of the EU into a new, gigantic government bureaucracy;
- on the other hand the rejection of even bigger government was partly expressed in a form that, absurdly enough, may very well pave the way for another, even uglier form of government expansion.
The outcome of the election is more dramatic than most media outlets have yet realized. Put bluntly, this election was a loss for European parliamentary democracy and a gain for authoritarianism of a kind Europe has not suffered from for a quarter century now. But as painful as it is to acknowledge, the real winners of this election were communists and aggressive nationalists – also known as fascists.
There is no mistaking the outcome: voters spoke, and numbers changed in the European Parliament. Political parties with a traditional commitment to parliamentary democracy lost dramatically, with conservatives and liberals losing more than one fifth of their seats. At the same time, communists and radical socialists of assorted flavors increased their parliamentary presence by one third.
Add to those gains the big inroads made by aggressive nationalists and fascists.
Europe’s political elite may want to ignore this, but the most dangerous reaction to this election would be to turn a blind eye to what voters did: they passed power out from the democratic center to the outer rim of the political spectrum. There, communists and fascists stood ready to scoop up voters who are deeply dissatisfied with, well, just about everything from unemployment and economic stagnation to immigration and “inequality”.
Europe is now at a fork in the road, one that will decide the fate of a continent that is home to half-a-billion people. But before we get there, let us take a look at what actually happened in the election.
Communist parties did well, especially in southern Europe where the Great Recession has done its biggest damage. In Greece, the radical leftist party Syriza, which sees Hugo Chavez’ Venezuela as a political role model, took 26 percent of the vote and became the largest Greek party in the EU Parliament. In Italy, incumbent prime minister Renzi’s leftist Democratic Party got 40 percent of the vote. Portugal’s old communist party, rebranded as socialists, came in first with 31.5 percent of the vote. In Spain, a radical socialist coalition took ten percent of the votes, placing them third in the election.
But it was not just in southern Europe that communists, old or new, did well. Ireland’s scary-left and historically terrorist-affiliated Sinn Fein got a frighteningly large 17 percent of the votes.
Sweden is an example of how refurbished communists have shown remarkable resiliency in the past two decades. Their radical left is split among three parties, which taken together is more than the country’s traditionally dominant social democrats got. The three radical leftist parties are: the Greens (15.3 percent of the vote), the renovated-communist Leftist Party (6.3) and the new, aggressively socialist Feminist Initiative (5.3).
Altogether, the entire leftist spectrum – from vanilla-favored social democrats to hardline Chavista leftists – held their lines in the European Parliament, in the face of stiff competition. But as indicated by the above mentioned examples, the radical flank within the leftist block made big advancements. Their European Parliament group, called GUE/NGL, increased its number of seats by one third. This number could increase even more when some small, new parties from across the EU choose affiliation.
The underlying message in the shift toward the hard left is that Europe’s voters – already living under the biggest governments in the free world – have forgotten what happens when government grows beyond the boundaries traditionally respected in Western Europe. Perhaps the most conspicuous signal of Europe’s communist amnesia is embedded in the seven percent voter share that Die Linke got in Germany. They are the old Socialist Unity Party, in other words the party that ruled East Germany with an iron fist and back-up from Soviet tanks throughout the Cold War. Die Linke is fiercely anti-capitalist and shares Syriza’s adoration for what Hugo Chavez did to Venezuela.
The fact that Die Linke only got 7.4 percent should be considered in the context of the fact that Germany’s Green Party captured 10.7 percent of the votes. This puts the radical left in Germany at 18.1 percent, a share that grows even more in view of the fact that the SPD, the social democrats, are now parked at a lowly 27 percent voter share. If the social democrats in Germany continue to decline, the combined voter share of the Green Party and the old East German communists could easily exceed 25 percent in the next German national elections.
A surging radical left in the European Parliament will have profound consequences for European politics, but it will also affect Europe’s relations to the United States. More on that in a moment. First, let us take a look at the other flank of the authoritarian lowland.
Known under its less sophisticated label “fascism”, authoritarian nationalists made frightening advancements in the election. Most notorious, of course, is the victory in France for Front National under Marine Le Pen’s stewardship. Her polished version of the party her father founded won a stunning 25.4 percent of the vote, putting them decisively ahead of the nearest competition.
Ten years ago, Front National was little more than a punch line in a political joke. Yes, Jean-Marie Le Pen technically came in second in a presidential run-off against incumbent Jacques Chirac, but the entire campaign was of the same kind as if the Democrats had put up Ralph Nader against George W Bush in 2004. (No other comparison intended between Nader and Le Pen, of course.) Today, Front National is at a point where their leader can confidently demand that President Hollande dissolve the national parliament for new elections. That is not going to happen, but the demand sent shivers through the French political establishment.
It should. Marine Le Pen is no longer just a French political contender – she is in fact not just the leader of what is currently the largest political party in France. She is emerging as the leader of a new, bold, aggressive nationalist movement in Europe. Her party group in the European Parliament will incorporate outspoken fascists such as Hungarian Jobbik (which came in second in Hungary and apparently has its own uniformed party corps). Some media reports state that Front National and Jobbik are already in talks with each other on how to cooperate in the European Parliament.
Another of Le Pen’s new friends is Golden Dawn, which in the European election confirmed its position as Greece’s third largest party. Despite extensive legal challenges and elected officials of the party currently being incarcerated, Golden Dawn refuses to go away. More than likely, their strong support among police and the military will be enough to let them return, emboldened and empowered, to both the Greek and the European political scene.
With Front National, Jobbik and Golden Dawn as their pillars, the aggressive nationalist party group in the European Parliament could indeed turn out to be a vehicle for the rebirth of European fascism. The deciding factor will be where Europe’s rapidly rising patriotic parties will land. This is a different breed than the aggressive nationalists, consisting of Euro-skeptic parties, best exemplified by Britain’s UKIP. There is now a whole range of parties in Europe that fall into this category, such as PVV in the Netherlands, Danish People’s Party, Swedish Democrats, True Finns, Alternative for Germany and Austria’s People’s Party.
Some of these parties did remarkably well: both UKIP and the Danish People’s Party won their countries’ respective European Parliament elections. The Swedish Democrats scored almost ten percent of the votes, double what they got in the national elections in 2010. Alternative for Germany surprised many by capturing as much as seven percent of the votes, while there was disappointment among PVV supporters in the Netherlands as their party only got 13 percent and a third place.
It is not an exaggeration to say that this new group of patriotic parties holds Europe’s fate in their hands. Their ideological foundation spans from “basically libertarian” as Nigel Farage once called UKIP to welfare-statist Swedish Democrats. But they all have in common that they are committed to traditional, European parliamentary principles. This sets them apart from the aggressive nationalists whose political visions do not exclude a new full-scale fascist experiment.
If some of the patriotic parties are lured into cooperation with Front National, Jobbik and Syriza, there is a significant risk that Europe, within the next five years, will see a continent-wide fascist movement. There are other aggressive nationalist parties lurking in the political backwoods, ready to capitalize on voter disgruntlement with existing political options. Among those, Germany’s National Democratic Party, NDP, actually captured on seat in the European Parliament this time around.
With the history of Front National in mind, only imagination sets boundaries to what the NPD can accomplish.
Another example is the Party of the Swedes. Originally called the National Socialist Front and merged with violence-prone Swedish Resistance Movement, the Party of the Swedes is waiting for the patriotic, parliamentarian Swedish Democrats to fail to deliver on their voters’ Euro-skepticism. While waiting, Party of the Swedes is gaining parliamentary skills at the local level around Sweden. That experience can then be used in a run for national office – and eventually to reach for the European Parliament.
While fundamentally anti-democratic movements gained ground, the surge of democratic, patriotic parties is the only silver lining in this European Parliament election. This group is still small compared to the traditional center-right parties known under their acronyms EPP (center-right) and ALDE (center-liberal). But these democratic, patriotic parties hold the map in their hands to Europe’s future. If the EPP and ALDE choose to cooperate with them, then Europe will choose the stable, democratic road to the future.
If, on the other hand, the Europhiles in EPP and ALDE continue to ignore the growing, sound, democratic version of Euro-skepticism, and instead charge ahead with their project of a grand European Super-Union, the voter reaction will be fierce and potentially catastrophic. At that point, voters will seek other, much less palatable outlets for their skepticism or outright resistance to the European project.
If leaders of Europe’s conservatives, liberals and social democrats do not pay attention to what actually happened in this European election, they will do Golden Dawn, Jobbik, NPD and Front National a service they will regret for the rest of their lives.
It does not matter if Marine Le Pen is a fascist or an aggressive nationalist. Her surge to pan-European prominence has uncorked a bottle where black-shirted genies have been locked away for decades. History has shown how relentlessly those genies can intoxicate cadres of voters and how viciously they can tear down the institutions of parliamentary democracy.
Europe is playing with fire. The only thing that stands between the torch of fascism, lit up in this election, and a pan-European bonfire is the skill and insightfulness of a small group of Europhile politicians and bureaucrats in the hallways of power in Brussels. So far the leaders of EPP and ALDE, as well as the European Commission, have thoroughly ignored the rise of Euro-skepticism around the continent. So far they have been completely tone deaf to widespread popular frustration with the EU project.
Hopefully, they will come around and start listening to their critics. Hopefully they will let Nigel Farage be the recognized voice of Euro-criticism. But time is running out. If nothing decisively happens soon, the same trend that was set in this election will begin to show up in national elections.
In 2017, the Palais de l’Elysee could have a new tenant – Marine Le Pen.
Never bark at the Big Dog. The Big Dog is always right.
As expected, the harsh reality of the European economy is beginning to sink in with the political leaders of the EU. For a while, the narrative has been that the European economy is rebounding and that unemployment is falling. I have maintained all along that there are no signs of any such recovery, and on Friday Eurostat released a report that begins to backtrack from the unwarranted optimism. However, as the EU Observer reports, the narrative has changed somewhat, now putting focus on differences between member states rather than the absence of any downward trend across the EU:
Figures released on Friday (2 May) by the EU’s statistical office, Eurostat, indicate large differences remain in unemployment rates across member states. The eurozone unemployment rate was 11.8% in March 2014, stable since December 2013, but down from 12.0% in March 2013 With an 11.8 percent overall jobless rate in the eurozone, the chances of people landing a job remain low in countries like Greece and Spain when compared to Austria and Germany. At 26.7 percent, austerity-hit Greece still has the worst unemployment rate in the EU, followed closely by Spain with 25.3 percent. Austria at 4.9 percent and Germany at 5.1 percent have the lowest.
There is a good reason why the new story in Europe is about differences between member states rather than the overall trend. Figure 1 reports quarterly data on total unemployment, not seasonally adjusted, for the EU as a whole and for the euro zone specifically:
Yes, there are differences between member states, but the differences become pointless of there is no overall positive trend in unemployment. Germany is a good example, with an unemployment rate at 5.5 percent in the first quarter of 2014. While this is low by European standards, it is important to note that there is no strong downward trend in these numbers. Yes, measured over the same quarter a year before (e.g., first quarter of 2014 compared to first quarter of 2013) the Germans do see a slow, weak but nevertheless visible improvement. However, the rate still fluctuates from quarter to quarter by as much as a half percentage point, showing somewhat of a weakness in the trend.
Figure 2 highlights further the lack of trend in unemployment:
Most notably, Greece and Italy have not yet reported full data for the first quarter of this year. So far their trends point steady upward, though numbers that I reported previously on the Greek GDP give us reason to believe that unemployment will be flat in early 2014. Italy is a more uncertain case, partly due to growing talks about the country leaving the euro.
It is positive, no doubt, that both Spain and Ireland saw a decline in unemployment in the first quarter of 2014 (the second quarter in a row for Ireland with a decline). However, at the same time French unemployment is steadily on the rise, a fact that, given the size of the French economy, will have hampering effects on any possible recovery in other euro-area countries.
As we return to the EU Observer story, we can hear the frustration echo through the EU head quarters:
EU social affairs commissioner Laszlo Andor called for more investment into job creation. “The ultimate factor that will determine Europe’s economic future is whether we can hold together and further strengthen our Economic and Monetary Union, or whether we let weaker members of the EU and of our societies drift away,” he said. Earlier this year, Andor warned that one in four Europeans is at risk of poverty, despite unemployment figures dropping in some member states. Young people are the worst affected by the unemployment crisis. Only around one in four people of working age under 25 have a job. To offset the trend, the EU last summer launched its Youth Guarantee scheme with a promise to help the young find jobs, continue their education, or land a traineeship within four months of becoming unemployed or leaving formal education. EU money to support the scheme is primarily sourced from the European Social Fund (ESF).
Which is built by, and maintained by, Europe’s taxpayers. Instead of doing something about the high taxes and other factors that prevent Europe’s entrepreneurs from creating jobs, the EU taxes people more so it can give money to the young men and women who cannot get jobs because of the high taxes.
Of course, as the EU Observer story continues, spending taxpayers’ money to create jobs is about as hopeless a project as trying to ride a bicycle in zero gravity:
But given the scale of the problem, the EU plan has been criticised for being underfunded and lacking in ambition. The Brussels-based European Youth Forum in a study out in April on ten member states says the scheme has yet to live up to its promises. “It is a good way of tackling youth unemployment but effectively so far there hasn’t been enough ambition in it and enough political will in some member states to implement it properly,” said a European Youth Forum spokesperson.
Wrong. The reason why it has not yet been successful is because it is a government program, spending taxpayers’ money when taxpayers should really be allowed to keep their money and spend it as they see fit. Because of the high taxes across Europe, only countries with strong exports industries are able to pull ahead (Germany and Austria are good examples). Until government rolls back its presence in the economy – on both the spending side and the taxation side – Europe will be stuck with its disastrously high unemployment levels. Temporary changes up or down will not make any difference over time.
What is the difference between a turtle and the European economy? The turtle is moving fast forward. There are no lights in the tunnel either, especially when we take into consideration the situation in the big French economy. The socialist government came into power on promises to get the economy going, turn the tide on employment and get the austerity dementors from Brussels off the back of the French people. They have not delivered on a single one of their promises, and even though it takes time for new economic policies to sink in, the French socialist government is closing in on two years in office and should at least be able to produce some credible signs of recovery. But that is not the case. On the contrary, whatever blip on the radar they have been able to produce is succumbing under their tax increases and even more stifling regulatory incursions into the private sector:
The rather tepid growth record of the French economy is having a real impact on its government’s relations to Brussels. With the tax base (GDP) barely growing at half a percent per year, it is arithmetically impossible for the government in Paris to close its budget gap. As a result, Euractiv.co, reports:
France is again seeking an extension from the EU on the deadline to reduce its national deficit. European Parliament President Martin Schulz supports the idea but the German government is insisting on adherence to the guidelines of the European Stability Pact. EurActiv Germany reports. In a speech earlier this week, French President François Hollande made it clear he would attempt to renegotiate Brussels’ demands to reduce the French deficit to under 3% of GDP by 2015. The new finance minister, Michel Sapin, also intends to renegotiate the timeline with the European Commission. “The government will have to convince Europe that France’s contribution to competitiveness, to growth, must be taken into account with respect to our commitments,” Holland said on 31 March. But the EU has already given the country two extra years to comply with the Stability Pact’s deficit limit of 3% of GDP.
This is raising tensions over the Stability and Growth Pact, effectively the legal deficit-cap instrument in the EU constitution:
On Thursday (3 April) in Frankfurt, ECB President Mario Draghi again stressed how important it was for eurozone countries to honour their fiscal commitments within the EU. On Friday morning, European Parliament (EP) President Martin Schulz, spoke in favour of meeting French demands. Schulz is the European Socialists’ candidate in the upcoming European elections. Speaking on BFM-TV in France, he said the country must be given more time to comply with the Maastricht criteria. The rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, with its debt limit of 3% must “be reconsidered”, said Schulz. Norbert Barthle is Bundestag spokesman on budgetary policy for Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In his view, another postponement of the deadline should only take place under clear conditions which state that France will really put its budget back on course. The chairman of the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) political group in the EP, Markus Ferber strongly criticised Schulz’s demands to soften the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact: “While the CDU and the CSU have been acting as a fire brigade to extinguish the euro debt-crisis, Martin Schulz is adding new fuel to the growing fire.”
Schulz is the socialist candidate for president of the EU Commission, with a strong statist agenda in his hand. His desire to water down the Stability and Growth Pact has nothing to do with concern for the French economy – it is primarily motivated by a desire to give government the room to grow without any real limits.
Secondarily, Schulz is vehemently against the austerity policies that the EU-ECB-IMF troika has been forcing on some EU states. I share his resistance, but for entirely different reasons. While Schulz sees austerity as an impediment on government growth, I view it – or at least its European iteration – as a macroeconomic poison pill. It is a good idea to stop austerity policies, but the replacement should absolutely not be more government. The French government is way too big, but this is also the case in Europe in general – which is why there is no recovery in sight. On the contrary, stagnation is the new normal. In the last quarter of 2013, industry activity in the EU-28 and euro-18 areas were as follows in key sectors, measured in gross value added (one of three ways of measuring GDP):
- Manufacturing grew 1.7 percent over the same quarter in 2012; 1.3 percent in the euro area;
- Construction declined 0.4 percent, the 11th quarter in a row with declining activity in this sector; in the euro area the decline was 1.7 percent, the 22nd negative quarter in a row!
- Finance and insurance contracted 0.9 percent in EU-28, 1.1 percent in euro-18.
Measured as employment, the numbers do not look better:
- Manufacturing employment contracted 0.7 percent in the fourth quarter of 2013, the eighth straight quarter with a decline; the decline was 1.2 percent in euro-18;
- Construction saw employment shrink by 1.4 percent, the 22nd straight negative quarter; the decline was a notable 2.9 percent in euro-18, marking the 23rd quarter in a row with declining construction employment;
- The financial-insurance industry basically stood still at +0.1 percent (-0.3 percent in euro-18).
(All numbers are from Eurostat.)
Things may turn around when we get the numbers from Q1 of 2014, but I see no substantial reason to expect a sustained recovery. On the contrary, everything points to continued stagnation, in France as well as in Europe. This does not bode well for the future of the continent – perhaps the EuropeanS should get used to scenes like this one:
This past weekend the French went to the ballot boxes in local elections. Recent pan-European polling has indicated that the socialists could become the largest group in the European Parliament, and that may very well happen. But if Sunday’s French local elections are any indication of what French voters think, perhaps the socialists in general should not get their hopes up too much. They were dealt a very serious blow by the electorate – and to make the defeat even more humiliating, the winners were of another, competing authoritarian brand:
The far-Right Front National (FN) was on course on Sunday night to make historic gains in France’s first nationwide elections since François Hollande became president. In what Marine Le Pen, the FN leader, described as a “breakthrough” and the “end of bipolarisation” of French politics, her party came out ahead in a string of French towns in the first round of municipal elections. The FN won an outright majority in the northern town of Henin-Beaumont and was first-placed in the eastern town of Forbach and the southern towns of Avignon, Perpignan and Béziers.
At the same time, the Telegraph reports, the socialist party…
was heading for heavy losses as voters appeared to punish his dithering and lack of results two years into his five-year mandate. These could trigger a re-shuffle of his cabinet, potentially seeing Ségolène Royal, his former partner and mother of four children, take up a ministerial post. … Almost 45 million French took to the ballot box to elect more than 36,000 mayors for the next six years in what was being seen as a test for the Socialist president, whose approval ratings have sunk below 20 per cent. While municipal elections are fought above all on local issues, disaffection with the main parties clearly bolstered the score of the anti-immigration, anti-EU Front National in the two-round contest.
The nationalists are the only political movement in Europe that can compete with the socialists in terms of authoritarianism. They are a less homogeneous crowd compared to the socialists, in part because Europe – at least right now – does not have that many strong outright communist parties. A notable exception is Syriza which essentially wants to turn Greece into a European version of Venezuela. However, the main reason for this is not that voters in Europe in general have turned their backs on collectivism – it is more a matter of socialists having pushed their ideological goals farther into the murky badlands of government expansionism. In some countries, like Italy, Portugal and Sweden, it is difficult to separate socialists from communists.
Alas, while the socialists are pretty well united around goals such as an even bigger welfare state, even more income redistribution and even more government interference with private businesses (and in some cases the nationalization of banks), the nationalists span a broader spectrum of views and visions. The “mild” version of the welfare state is represented by the Swedish Democrats and the Danish People’s Party in Scandinavia, the Pim Fortuyn List in the Netherlands and the Austrian People’s Party. A bit farther away are Vlaams Belang in Belgium, a separatist, nationalist party that basically wants to split Belgium in half and form an independent Flemish republic. Hungary’s ruling nationalists also belong in this category, as does Front National in France.
So far, the nationalists are essentially modern versions of reborn social-democrat parties from the 1920s and ’30s. Vigorously nationalist as those parties were, they drew a firm demarcation line between themselves and working-class imperialist communist parties of that time. The nationalism of the social-democrat movements were skillfully toned down and eventually removed after World War II and the atrocities committed by the National Socialists in Germany, leaving a vacuum that became even more glaring as Europe – in the middle of its long-term unemployment crisis – opened their doors to large scores of non-European, non-Christian immigrants.
Nationalists began alleging, in some instances correctly, that immigrants came and took jobs from Europe’s own young. They also alleged, even more correctly, that large segments of the immigrant population ended up living well off the welfare state. While the correct conclusion would have been to abolish the welfare state and respect each individual’s right to migrate if he can support himself, the nationalist conclusion was to reduce or even stop entirely any new immigration from outside the EU.
In some cases this sentiment has escalated to yet another level. Golden Dawn in Greece represents its most aggressive iteration, but the National Democrat Party in Germany are not far behind. In Sweden, the Party of the Swedes is capitalizing on rising but misguided frustration over high unemployment – especially among the young – and large immigration. Having their roots in now-defunct the National Socialist Front, the Party of the Swedes is not ashamed of calling for a fascist Sweden.
Some claim that this the outermost extreme of Europe’s new nationalist movement is out to build a unified, European fascist state. I would not be surprised if they are correct, but so far I have not found fully credible sources for this claim. Nevertheless, such an ambition goes well with traditional fascist ideology and would explain their keen interest in gaining a strong foothold in the EU parliament.
The big tragedy in all this is not that one of two collectivist, authoritarian flanks are competing for political power in Europe. The big tragedy is that less-collectivist segments of the European political spectrum are slowly imploding. Christian Democrats, Conservatives and Liberals have all been passionately pro-EU for decades, and now that the EU has basically turned into a power-grabbing behemoth voters quickly associate the power grab and the destruction of large parts of the European economy with the most EU-friendly parties. When they are now pushed to the edge of their own economic existence, and when they feel that their national governments are basically powerless vs. the EU, millions of voters turn to radical parties to find a “quick fix”.
Does this mean Europe’s fascism has been reborn? Eric Draitser over at the Boiling Frogs Blog seems to think so. He draws parallels between the nationalist movement in Ukraine and Syriza in Greece. I do not completely agree with him – I do not yet see a fully coherent fascist movement across Europe – but his article is well worth a read. I do agree that there is a dark shadow rising over Europe; the big question is just how big and ominous that shadow will become. And there is absolutely no doubt that it is growing, as shown in part by the very strong performance of Front National in France this past weekend.
Recently I have reported how Europe’s troubles continue, now in the form of deflation and rising poverty. But unemployment is still a major issue; recent signs of plateauing or even a minor decline in joblessness are indicators of stagnation rather than a recovery under way.
Today I can report yet more evidence that Europe’s crisis is continuing. From Euractiv:
One of French President François Hollande’s ambitions is to put in place social and fiscal convergence between his country and Germany, but for now the two economies are taking opposite turns. The number of unemployed people looking for a job has increased by 0.3% in France, which marks the president’s failure to decrease unemployment by the end of 2013. According to official figures published by the Labour Ministry this week, people without any activity (known as category A) have reached a record high number of over 3 million. Categories B and C (persons who have a slower activity) has increased by 0.5 to reach 4,898,100 in continental France and over 5 million including the overseas territories.
It is difficult to give “slower activity” a statistically meaningful definition. However, there are some ways to measure it, and as Eurostat has shown there is a widespread problem in Europe with people not getting full-time jobs. Part of the reason, especially in the French case, is the incredible rigidity of their hire-and-fire laws. But on top of that there is also the problem with unending austerity – aimed at saving the welfare state when tax revenues decline – which depresses overall economic activity. So long as European austerity continues there can be no recovery in private-sector activity. As a result, the French government will fail miserably in its attempts to put the economy back on a growth track again. This failure includes the so called “responsibility pact” that the socialist government came up with last year. Euractiv again:
These figures were published on the day when Prime Minister Jean Marc Ayrault was meeting with employers’ and trade unions’ organisations to launch the “responsibility pact” announced by the president and which looks to reduce employers’ contributions in exchange for commitments for more job creation.
Long story short, the French government is doing practically everything wrong. That includes trying to take advice from its German neighbor. Back to Euractiv (and a poorly written part of the article):
The situation is Germany is radically different. At the beginning of January, Germany unveiled that after four months of rising unemployment, figures fell by 15,000 to 2965 million [sic!] in December in seasonally adjusted (SA) data, according to the Federal Labour Office. The unemployment rate remained stable at 0.9%, [sic!] close to its lowest level since 1990, after a peak in 2011. In absolute numbers the job seekers, however, increased by 2.87 million against 2.80 million in November and the unemployment rate reached 6.7% against 6.5%.
Obviously, Germany does not have 2,965 million unemployed – the article meant to say 2.965 million. Also, the German unemployment rate is not 0.9 percent… The latest monthly Eurostat figure, from November 2013, is a seasonally adjusted 5.2 percent. This is still low, and less than half of the EU average. But the trend is no longer downward, and there is a good reason for that. Consider the following national accounts numbers for the German economy, reported in fixed prices:
The Gross exports numbers explain why the German economy has been so good at producing jobs recently. But as the number for 2013 shows, that boom is tapering off. In order to keep growing, the German economy would need the domestic, private sector to take over. The only way this could happen is if private consumption went into high gear, obviously has not happened. Over the seven years reported here, German private consumption has exceeded two percent growth in one year only, namely the second year of the fabulous export boom of 2010-11. With consumption growing at less than one percent, and the export boom coming to an end, it is safe to say that the German economy will not continue to push down its unemployment rate. Not surprisingly, GDP growth is now below one percent for the second year in a row, with a declining trend.
These numbers from Germany verify that the European economy completely lacks ability to grow on its own. The reason, again, is the depressing campaign to save fiscally doomed welfare states in the midst of a recession. If Europe’s political leaders had the courage – as well as moral conviction and economic insight – to let go of the delusion of a big, redistributive government, then Europe would quickly rise to once again become an engine in the global economy.
Until that happens, Europe’s fate is the same as that of other formerly great industrial nations, such as Argentina. However, because of the extreme rigidity of European politics I fear that the economic wasteland opening up in Europe will have consequences that reach even farther than the decline and fall of one of Latin America’s economic powers.