Over the past few years, Hungary has made a name for itself as one of Europe’s most nationalist countries. The nationalism that has been channeled through the Fidesz party has inspired other nationalists in Europe, as well as raised concerns among those who fear the authoritarian flank of the nationalist movement.
I normally do not want to speculate in the relations between economic growth and ideological dynamics – I do, for example, not believe that nationalism can be dismissed as the response of poor, bitter, uneducated rednecks to adverse economic challenges. That narrative is the product of ivory-tower academics suffering from serious real-life comprehension deficiency.
Nationalism is much more complicated than that. It is, on the one hand, a sound patriotic expression of love for your country. I admire American patriotism, which combines a strong belief in the founding values of this great country with a generosity and openness toward everyone willing to respect those values, assimilate and live in peace and harmony with their fellow Americans. British politician Nigel Farage and his UKIP are driven by a similar, British patriotism. Mr. Farage has my full respect and support.
On the other hand, I fear the authoritarian version of nationalism which I see lurking in the shadows behind Marine Le Pen, and which have come out in the open with full force in the Golden Dawn movement in Greece.
I cannot say definitively where Hungary’s Fidesz party stands on the scale between patriotism and authoritarianism, but I think we can get a bit of an idea from looking at what has happened in the Hungarian economy in recent years. But before we get there, let us listen briefly to what the speaker of the Hungarian parliament had to say the other day about his country’s relation to the EU. Euractiv has the story:
If the European Union wants to dictate to Hungary, then the country should consider slowly backing out of the union, Parliamentary Speaker and Fidesz MP László Kövér said on 24 October, as quoted by the Hungarian press. … Kövér said that if Brussels wants to tell a country how it should be governed, then it resembles Moscow before the change of regime in 1989. The speaker reportedly said that if this is the direction the EU takes, then Hungary should consider leaving the union. He added however that this was only “a nightmare” scenario, and that he doubted it would come to that.
There are two, somewhat disparate reasons why Mr. Kövér would say something like this. The first reason is that the EU is indeed a super-state organization that merrily gets involved in every aspect of national politics. Nigel Farage often says that 75 percent of all new laws that apply in Britain are made in Brussels. Regardless of where the exact number is, there is no doubt that the EU continuously expands its powers at the cost of national sovereignty; the EU’s disastrous mishandling of the Great Recession and the debt crises in southern EU states brought out in full force the arrogance, even borderline totalitarian, power grabbing desires that Brussels is home to. From this viewpoint it is entirely understandable that the Hungarians are frustrated with the EU.
The second reason for the speaker’s lashing out is not quite as easily understood. The Hungarian economy has taken a bad beating during the Great Recession and is still struggling to get moving again. Let us take a look at the most critical GDP component, namely private consumption:
Figure 1 reports two angles of private consumption in the Hungarian economy and the EU. The solid lines, which refer to the left vertical axis, represent the consumption share of GDP in the EU (green) and Hungary (purple). The share has been stable in the EU but declined in Hungary.
If GDP has grown strongly in Hungary, then the decline in the consumption share is not much of a problem. However, from 2007 through 2013 annual inflation-adjusted GDP growth in Hungary was -0.53 percent, on average. That us worse than crisis-ridden Ireland, Spain and Cyprus, and only a hair better than Portugal and Italy. With this in mind, it is hardly a surprise that private consumption in Hungary has exhibited such a deplorable growth record as reported by the purple dashed line (reference the right vertical axis). Average for 2007-2013 is -1.45 percent, worse than all the aforementioned crisis-plagued countries.
Herein lies part of the explanation to why the Hungarian parliamentary speaker is so vocal with his EU criticism. The nationalist government has not been very strong on promoting economic freedom. According to the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom, Hungary scores poorly in key categories such as government spending, monetary freedom, property rights protection and corruption. Although Fidesz may not be pursuing an open, deliberate statist strategy, the combined effects of their policies is in fact an advancement of government at the expense of the private sector.
It is very likely that statist nationalism is now taking such a toll on the Hungarian economy that voters, taxpayers and even business men are beginning to complain, loudly. In situations like this, it is a well established strategy in politics to turn people’s attention somewhere else. What better object of popular frustration than the EU?
Hungary is a country with a long, rich and fascinating history. Budapest is one of the most beautiful cities in Europe. I wish the Hungarian people all the best, but I do believe it is time for them to take another look at where their nationalist leaders are taking them, politically as well as economically.
I am a strong supporter of the United States armed forces, which are the world’s most powerful force for liberty. But war and other armed conflicts are costly in more ways than one; there is a much more efficient way to break down tyranny.
The world’s largest authoritarian regime, China, is slowly but steadily reforming in the right direction. The underlying force moving China in the right direction is, plainly, economic freedom. When people are free to own property, be entrepreneurial, build wealth and pursue a lifestyle above what a state-run economy can provide, they will eventually demand political freedom as well. The Chinese leaders know this, but they also know that political freedom can be destructive if introduced before a country is ready for it. They wisely and fearfully look at what happened in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, where political freedom preceded economic freedom – and economic freedom was introduced haphazardly.
But the benefits of economic freedom are not just limited to authoritarian nations. Other countries where government plays a destructively large role can also benefit substantially from a new dose of economic freedom. As I explain in my new book Industrial Poverty, Europe is going backwards as an economy because of persistent efforts by the political leadership to preserve the welfare state and all its big spending programs – not to mention its high taxes.
Economic freedom comes in many forms: deregulation, termination of spending programs, tax cuts… and free trade between sovereign nations. Often, free trade can be an inroad for economic freedom to open up heavily regulated economies. In Europe’s case, free trade with more regions of the world could give some entrepreneurs opportunity to thrive when the domestic economy is holding them back.
Therefore, it would be good if the EU could ratify its pending free trade agreements with the United States and Canada. Unfortunately, it does not look like that is about to happen, at least any time soon. And the reason is a section of the trade agreements that protects private investments under certain conditions. The EU Observer reports:
Provisions allowing companies to sue governments to protect their investments must be taken out of an EU-Canada trade agreement (Ceta), German chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition partners have said. Speaking in the Bundestag on Thursday (25 September), Sigmar Gabriel, who leads the centre-left SPD, noted that “the chapter regarding investment protection is not approvable,” adding that “the last word hasn’t been spoken yet”.
So what is this investment protection that the European left is so passionately opposed to? Here is how the Office of the United States Trade Representative explains it:
[The U.S. government] seek to ensure that Americans investing abroad are provided the same kinds of basic legal protections that we provide in the United States to both Americans and foreigners doing business within our borders. One element we use to achieve that goal is investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). ISDS creates a fair and transparent process, grounded in established legal principles, for resolving individual investment disputes between investors and states. … Over the last 50 years, nearly 3,200 trade and investment agreements among 180 countries have included investment provisions, and the vast majority of these agreements have included some form of ISDS. The United States entered its first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) in 1982, and is party to 50 agreements currently in force with ISDS provisions.
Another point made by the U.S. Trade Representative is that the ISDS does not allow any government regulations at all. As anyone even remotely familiar with the United States economy would know, that is absolutely false. We have our own (un-)fair share of regulations. All that the ISDS does is protect private investors from arbitrary, authoritarian government intrusions into the realm of free enterprise.
The European interpretation of ISDS is a bit less forthright. The EU Observer again:
celebrations are likely to be muted now that the [Canada-EU trade] agreement, which is widely seen as a trial run for the ongoing trade talks with the US, faces a number of obstacles before it is ratified. The mechanism, known as investor state dispute settlement (ISDS), allows companies to take legal action against governments if their decisions risk undermining their investments. Critics of ISDS claim that investor claims can prevent governments from passing legislation in fields such as environmental and social protection, enabling corporations to claim potentially unlimited damages in “arbitration panels” if their profits are adversely affected by new regulations.
The part about “unlimited damages” is patently absurd. It would require a forecast for the investment in question that credibly predicts endless profits. But you do not need to study finance or economics to realize that such forecasts simply do not exist. That would require something called “perfect foresight”, an ability of economic agents to predict the world with absolute certainty.
But as the EU Observer reports, reason and good analysis do not prevent leftist hardliners from acting according to their beliefs:
Deputies from the centre-left Socialist and Democrat group and the Liberals have indicated that ISDS would have to be left out in order for them to support Ceta, while the Green and far-left GUE factions have already come out against the treaty. … In a statement on Thursday, the European trades union congress (ETUC) said that it would not support Ceta if ISDS remained part of the agreement. The ETUC also called on officials to include a list of sectors that would not be liberalised by the agreement and for Canada to sign up to the International Labour Organisation Conventions.
The EU Commission appears to be determined to complete the trade agreement with Canada. However, the left-bound winds in the EU Parliament are a guarantee for a protracted battle. This is unfortunate, since the EU is in dire need of strengthening its economy. In lieu of advancements for economic freedom inside the EU, a couple of trans-Altantic free-trade agreements would be of great help.
In the last quarter of the 20th century large parts of the world lifted themselves out of poverty. China and India are the best known but far from the only examples. Countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Korea elevated themselves to a standard of living that for most of the population meant life in the global middle class. The Soviet sphere collapsed and allowed hundreds of millions of people from Saxony to Sakhalin to pursue happiness unhindered by government.
Now the prosperity train is slowly making its way through the African continent. Its effect is still marginal, but global corporations have discovered pockets of economic environments in Africa where they can actually set up operations with reasonable prospects of stability and profit.
While this is happening, the old industrialized parts of the world have mismanaged their prosperity. Latin America offers a split image with Argentina and Venezuela sinking into the holes of socialism while Chile and Brazil are examples of economic progress. The United States is still an economic superpower but has over the past 25 years allowed its government to grow irresponsibly large. It is still manageable and we are moving forward economically, but not at the pace we could.
Europe is the black sheep of the industrialized family, having squandered its prosperity for the sake of income redistribution. While Europe has not yet sunk into abject poverty, and probably never will, the continent has entered a stage of economic stagnation that it will take a very long time to get out of. In fact, the European economy is beginning to resemble some of the less oppressive countries in the Soviet sphere – not in terms of political oppression, but in terms of the destructive presence of government in the economy. Europe has, partially and unintentionally but nevertheless destructively, adopted the static statism that characterized countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary before the Iron Curtain came down.
The stagnant nature of the European economy and the slower-than-capacity growth rates in the United States and Canada are all self inflicted. The fatally erroneous belief that government has a productive role to play in the economy inhibits the creation of prosperity in parts of the world where, fundamentally, the conditions for creating prosperity are better than anywhere else. This structural mismanagement of some of the world’s wealthiest economies have ramifications far beyond their own jurisdictions. By keeping their economies from growing, Europe’s political leaders hold back demand for products from countries on the verge of climbing out of poverty. By holding back the forces of prosperity, America’s political leaders prevent the creation of a surplus that otherwise could provide funds for development and investment projects in developing countries.
Instead of unleashing the prosperity machine we know as capitalism and economic freedom, governments in Europe and North America spend far too much time trying to preserve their welfare states. When their government-run entitlement programs promise more than taxpayers can pay for, they resort to growth-hampering austerity measures, aimed not at reducing the presence of government in the economy but at saving the very structure and philosophy of the welfare state. The result, again, is stagnation and industrial poverty.
The First World’s obsession with the welfare state thus prevents the proliferation of prosperity to parts of the world still struggling in poverty. By means of economic freedom, nationally and globally, the relatively wealthy can help the poor toward a better life. This cannot be stressed strongly enough; if accounts of the demerits of the welfare state are not enough to turn our political leaders in favor of economic freedom, then perhaps a new report on global poverty can help. Published by an organization called ATD Fourth World, Challenge 2015: Towards Sustainable Development that Leaves No One Behind provides a painfully direct account of abject poverty around the globe. The authors do not exhibit any deeper understanding of what causes poverty, but the parts of the report that tell the story of poverty from the “ground level” are definitely worth reading.
More than that, they provide a stark contrast to the destructive policies used in Europe and North America to preserve the welfare state. Instead of raising taxes and putting more of our own people on welfare, we owe it to the rest of the world to maximize our creation of prosperity. We can only do that by relieving our own population of the shackles of artificial redistribution. With more wealth, higher incomes and a growing standard of living we will have more money to trade with developing countries, as well as more surplus to donate to and invest in productive development projects in the poorest parts of the world.
Economic freedom has elevated billions of people from abject poverty to a respectable standard of living. It has elevated millions into true prosperity, and thousands upon thousands to almost unlimited wealth. It can do the same for those still in poverty. All it takes is that we in the most prosperous nations of the world sort out our priorities and responsibilities.
As an institutional economist I focus my research on the role that institutions and policy structures play in our economy. It is a fascinating niche in economics, and when combined with macroeconomics it becomes one of the most powerful analytical tools out there. So far, over the past 2.5 years, everything I have predicted about the European crisis has turned out to be correct; my upcoming book Industrial Poverty makes ample use of institutional economics and macroeconomics to show why Europe’s crisis is far more than just a protracted recession.
In economics, the institutional methodology is often pinned against econometrics, the mainstream methodological favorite. I don’t see it that way – econometrics has its place in economics – but the mainstream of the academic side of economics has given econometrics a far bigger role than it can handle. This has led to over-confidence among econometricians which, in turn, has led to a downplay or, in many cases, complete disregard for the benefits that other methodologies bring. The worst consequence of this over-reliance on econometrics was the multiplier debacle at the IMF, with serious consequences for the Greek economy. (How many young Greeks are unemployed today because their government implemented austerity policies based on IMF miscalculations?) A wider, better understanding for economic institutions and their interaction with the macroeconomy could help mainstream economists a long way toward a deeper, more complete understanding of the economy and, ultimately, toward giving better policy advice.
As an example of how institutional analysis can inform more traditional analysis, consider this interesting article on the European crisis by Economics Nobel Laureate Michael Spence and David Brady, Deputy Director of the Hoover Institution:
Governments’ inability to act decisively to address their economies’ growth, employment, and distributional challenges has emerged as a major source of concern almost everywhere. In the United States, in particular, political polarization, congressional gridlock, and irresponsible grandstanding have garnered much attention, with many worried about the economic consequences. But, as a recent analysis has shown, there is little correlation between a country’s relative economic performance in several dimensions and how “functional” its government is. In fact, in the six years since the global financial crisis erupted, the US has outperformed advanced countries in terms of growth, unemployment, productivity, and unit labor costs, despite a record-high level of political polarization at the national level.
This is true, and as I demonstrate in Industrial Poverty, a major reason for this is that the American economy is not ensnared in a welfare state like the European. We still lack a couple of major institutional components that they have: general income security and a government-run, single-payer health care system. That said, the U.S. economy is not exactly performing outstandingly either:
Yes, we are currently in better shape than Europe, but we are also doing worse than ourselves 20, 30 or 40 years ago.
Let’s keep this in mind as we continue to listen to Spence and Brady – their discussion about political dysfunction is actually tied to the role of the welfare state in the economy:
[In] terms of overall relative economic performance, the US clearly is not paying a high price for political dysfunction. Without dismissing the potential value of more decisive policymaking, it seems clear that other factors must be at work. Examining them holds important lessons for a wide range of countries. Our premise is that the global integration and economic growth of a wide range of developing countries has triggered a multi-decade process of profound change. These countries’ presence in the tradable sector of the global economy is affecting relative prices of goods and factors of production, including both labor and capital.
And the government structures that aim to redistribute income and wealth within a country. High-tax economies lose out to low-tax economies. The Asian tigers have generally held tax advantages over their European competitors, but they have also held advantages on the other side of the welfare-state equation as well. By not putting in place indolence-inducing entitlement systems they have kept their work force more shaped toward high-productivity labor than is the case in the old, mature welfare states of Europe.
Why does the welfare state not change, then, in response to increased global competition? After all, Japan, China, South Korea and other Asian countries have been on the global market for decades. Enter the political dysfunction that Spence and Brady talk about. Unlike the United States, there is almost universal agreement among Europe’s legislators that the welfare state should be not only preserved but also vigorously defended in times of economic crisis. This has been the motive behind the European version of austerity, with the result that taxes have gone up, spending has gone down and the price of the welfare state for the private sector has increased, not been reduced as would be the logical response to increased global competition.
It is not entirely clear what kind of American political dysfunction Spence and Brady refer to, but if it has to do with fighting the deficit, they are absolutely on target.
In fact, probably without realizing it, Spence and Brady make an important observation about the long-term role of the welfare state:
Relatively myopic policy frameworks may have worked reasonably well in the early postwar period, when the US was dominant, and when a group of structurally similar advanced countries accounted for the vast majority of global output. But they cease working well when sustaining growth requires behavioral and structural adaptation to rapid changes in comparative advantage and the value of various types of human capital.
If understood as a general comment on the institutional structure of an economy, this argument makes a lot of sense. So long as the traditional industrialized world only had to compete with itself, it could expand its welfare states without paying a macroeconomic price for it. Gunnar Myrdal, Swedish economist and a main architect of the Scandinavian welfare-state model, confidently declared back in 1960 that the welfare state had no macroeconomic price tag attached to it. Back then, it was easy to let government sprawl in every direction imaginable without any losses in terms of growth, income and employment. That is no longer possible.
Spence and Brady then make this excellent observation of the American economy:
What, then, accounts for the US economy’s relatively good performance in the post-crisis period? The main factor is the American economy’s underlying structural flexibility. Deleveraging has occurred faster than in other countries and, more important, resources and output have quickly shifted to the tradable sector to fill the gap created by persistently weak domestic demand. This suggests that, whatever the merit of government action, what governments do not do is also important. Many countries have policies that protect sectors or jobs, thereby introducing structural rigidities. The cost of such policies rises with the need for structural change to sustain growth and employment (and to recover from unbalanced growth patterns and shocks).
The move of resources from the domestic to the foreign-trade sector is visible in national accounts data as a rise of gross exports as share of current-price GDP from 9.1 percent in 2003 to 13.5 percent in 2013. Furthermore, actual growth numbers for exports relative private consumption reinforce the point made by Spence and Brady: from 20087 to 2013 private consumption has increased by 15 percent in current prices, while gross exports have increased by more than 22 percent. For every new dollar Americans doled out on cars, food, haircuts and motel nights, foreign buyers added $1.50 to what they spend on our products.
However, let us once again remember that the adaptation of the American economy should be viewed against the backdrop of a smaller welfare state. As I have discussed on several occasions, European countries are also making big efforts at increasing exports. They are not as lucky in using foreign sales as a demand-pull mechanism for restarting their economies. One reason, again, is the rigor oeconomicus that the welfare state injects into the economy.
Spence and Brady also compare the United States to a number of other countries, noting that:
Removing structural rigidities is easier said than done. Some stem from social-protection mechanisms, focused on jobs and sectors rather than individuals and families. Others reflect policies that simply protect sectors from competition and generate rents and vested interests. In short, resistance to reform can be substantial precisely because the results have distributional effects. Such reform is not market fundamentalism. The goal is not to privatize everything or to uphold the mistaken belief that unregulated markets are self-regulating. On the contrary, government has a significant role in structural transitions. But it must also get out of the way.
In short – and my words, not theirs: reform away the welfare state. Its detrimental influence actually stretches deeper than perhaps Spence and Brady recognize: it does indeed protect large sectors from competition by simply monopolizing them. Health care is a good example, with a government monopoly spilling over on medical-technology products. Another good example is income security, where many European countries have de facto monopolized every aspect from parental-leave benefits to retirement security. Education is a third example, where the United States, despite its heavily socialized K-12 system has a very strong private sector for academic education. This sector is almost entirely absent in many European countries.
Again, it is good to see a different approach to economic analysis than the traditional one based on econometrics and often irresponsibly simplified quantitative analysis. In a situation like the European crisis, it is very important for economists and other social-science scholars (Brady is a political scientist) to broaden the analysis and focus on such variables that rarely change. Among those are economic institutions such as the welfare state, and the political and economic incentives at work in Europe to preserve it, even in the face of mounting global competition.
There is no bigger threat to economic freedom than an authoritarian government. It destroys property rights and economic incentives. It crushes the pillars of entrepreneurship and makes it practically impossible for people to make an honorable living on their own. Gradually, an authoritarian government destroys free-market capitalism, and when the destruction has reached a critical point the most obvious economic result is the inevitable decline in the standard of living for all.
Misery replaces opportunity. Poverty replaces prosperity. Government dependency replaces self determination.
There is nothing new in this. The history of the 20th century is filled to the brim with evidence of the destructive effects of authoritarianism, including its devastating power to destroy well-functioning economies and the prosperity they produce. It would be logical to conclude that we have learned the lessons of the Soviet empire, of the collapse of collectivist economic projects in Latin America and of the slow but unrelenting stagnation of Europe’s welfare states.
You would expect that those lessons would be loud and clear, available to everyone.
Unfortunately, that is not the case. Socialism is on a worldwide rebound. It is not new: already eight years ago I warned about the resurrection of communism in Europe. At that time it was a topic that nobody really paid any attention to. This is understandable. The economy was in pretty good shape, both in the United States and in Europe – in other words there was no reason to worry about depression-driven support for extremism of the kind we can witness in Europe today. The terror attacks of 9/11 were in fresh memory, as were the attacks in London in the summer of 2005. The only extremism that made its way into the public debate had an islamist trademark.
Nevertheless, my warning was timely. Communism and its ideological affiliates have been on the rise for a long time. After a decade in disarray following the fall of the Soviet empire, socialists regained strength and confidence after 9/11. In addition to their support for Saddam Hussein’s regime and opposition to any efforts to topple it, they started lining up their political assets in parliamentary democracies to advance their ideology on democratic terms. In the mid-2000s, the global left was becoming politically savvy thanks in part to idolized authoritarians like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.
Today, socialism has made dangerous inroads on several fronts around the world. The socialist power structure that Chavez put in place is still in charge of Venezuela, and perhaps even more radical now than under his reign. The “Chavista” version of Latin American socialism has spun off at least two other authoritarian leaders in the region, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. In a separate but parallel advancement of socialism in Latin America, Cristina Kirchner has driven Argentina into the same ditch on the left side of the road as the gentlemen Chavez, Morales and Correa have done with their countries.
In Europe, the last few years of serious economic crisis has pushed large groups of voters into the arms of socialist parties. It is a remarkably broad phenomenon that has made Chavez-admiring Syriza one of the largest parties in Greece; it led to the sweeping French socialist election victories a couple of years ago; in September it will probably carry the surging left-wing coalition in Sweden to a strong election victory (on a message that the world’s highest taxes are not high enough!).
Even the nationalist movement in Europe is a form of socialism. Hungary’s Fidesz and Jobbik adhere to the same economic collectivism as do Golden Dawn in Greece, Front National in France and an assortment of smaller, nationalist parties in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Denmark and Sweden. The difference between socialists and nationalists in Europe is, essentially, that the former want to expand the welfare state with no inhibitions while the latter want to reserve the services of the welfare state for the people of their individual countries, and not share them with immigrants from – primarily – Africa and the Middle East.
(Disclaimer: UKIP, Britain’s patriotic movement, is basically a libertarian party. They are opposed to the welfare state and to immigration aimed at living off it, but unlike continental and Scandinavian nationalist parties they also want to ultimately dismantle the welfare state. As such they are rather alone on the European political scene. Now back to our regular broadcast.)
The rebound of socialism is not limited to Europe and Latin America. The Obama administration was carried into office by a warped belief that government can take care of people from cradle to grave. Obama and his fervent supporters soon found that Americans still have a strong sense of individualism and skepticism toward government as a partner through life. It is fair to say that on a broad scale, Obama’s aggressive statist agenda has peaked and so has collectivism in America. The question is how we as a country will downsize government, and whether or not it will happen on fiscally sustainable terms.
Others are not so lucky. South Africa is a good example. After two decades of European-inspired welfare statism, South African voters have grown a bit weary of the ANC. Their hold on power is not yet in jeopardy, but it has weakened in recent years. As I have explained in numerous articles, the reasons for this weakened support for the ANC are obvious to any sober observer of the South African economy. Poverty is pandemic among black South Africans and has slowly but steadily spread to colored and white South Africans as well. Unemployment and crime have become permanent phenomena, especially – but not exclusively – in the large areas of the country that still live in abject poverty.
Despite 20 years of promises, the ANC has delivered precisely what socialism always delivers: decline, deprivation and despair. As a result, many South Africans are turning to alternative political movements, and one of the first to capitalize on this is Julius Malema. The former president of the ANC’s youth league has formed his own political movement, an outright communist party that pervertedly calls itself the “Economic Freedom Fighters”. Here is some of what they want to do to South Africa:
A supposition that the South African economy can be transformed to address the massive unemployment, poverty and inequality crisis without transfer of wealth from those who currently own it to the people as a whole is illusory. The transfer of wealth from the minority should fundamentally focus on the commanding heights of the economy. This should include minerals, metals, banks, energy production, and telecommunications and retain the ownership of central transport and logistics modes such as Transnet, Sasol, Mittal Steel, Eskom, Telkom and all harbours and airports.
They have similar plans for agricultural land, with the intent to redistribute it from current owners and users to others, ostensibly based on racial preferences. The miserable consequences of land expropriation in Zimbabwe have apparently not deterred them. Nor has the economic disaster created by Chavez in Venezuela, where government has gotten itself involved in everything from utilities to the production and distribution of food. Not surprisingly, Julius Malema, South Africa’s premier communist, wants to do the same.
A communist government is just about the last thing South Africa needs. By the same token, Europe is absolutely not in any need of more collectivist policies. Latin America’s socialist experiments must end now, so the continent can reap the harvests of its full economic potential under economic freedom.
Currently, much of the global socialist rebound is currently flying under the radar of freedom-minded scholars, activists and politicians. Let’s hope that changes.
I got some really positive feedback on my first austerity video. Thank you! The topic is timely, especially with reference to the crisis in Europe. After the elections in May when statist parties on the left gained seats in the European Parliament, the debate over how to handle the perennial economic slump has intensified. Austerity critics have become more vocal, and the funniest part of that is that they do not even realize that the kind of austerity they criticize is really the kind I define as “Government-First” austerity in my video.
This is telling of what the debate over austerity in Europe is really about, and who the participants are. Proponents of the European version of austerity are not out to reduce the size of government, but to make sure government – the welfare state to be precise – survives the recession as unharmed as possible. As I point out on the video, if they had a “Limited Government” purpose behind their austerity they would use private-sector growth, or lack thereof, as their metrics for whether or not austerity was successful. But since private-sector activity has been plunging in the countries hit worst by the European version of austerity, it is clear that the purpose behind austerity as applied in the EU is of the “Government First” kind.
This puts an absurd light on far-leftist criticism of austerity. Since there are no limited-government proponents on the scene in the European debate, statists are bashing statists over not using the right tools to save the welfare state. With the noise from their fight rising, it is becoming increasingly likely that my predictions for Europe’s future will come true: the continent is bound for a new form of stagnation. So long as Europe does not dispose of the welfare state, they will end up right there, in the economic wasteland of industrial poverty.
The harder the far left works to end government-first austerity, the farther to the left they will pull economic policy in Europe. Instead of trying to balance government budgets as a means toward saving the welfare state, the far left does not even want to have to worry about the budget. Their attacks on the EU’s constitutional stability and growth pact are symptomatic of this.
Austerity criticism is not limited to the EU level. Wherever socialists have made headway in national parliamentary elections they raise their anti-austerity voices. Italy is a case in point, as illustrated by an article in the EU Observer:
The EU is at a “crossroads” between accepting a long period of austerity and high unemployment or taking steps to boost an economic recovery, Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi has warned. Speaking in national parliament on Tuesday (24 June), Renzi told deputies that “high priests and prophets of austerity” were stifling the European economy. Renzi’s government takes control of the EU’s six month rotating presidency next week and has indicated that migration and the bloc’s stability and growth pact will be its main policy priorities. The Italian prime minister has led calls for the pact’s rules on budget deficits to be interpreted in a way that encourages more public investment.
In other words, what they want to be able to do is to spend more on government-run, tax-funded education, on more roads, mass transit and so called research and development programs. They also want to pour more money into non-fossil energy, the kind of complete waste that has been Germany’s failed attempt at replacing nuclear energy with “renewable” energy sources. (Out of utter panic over rising energy prices, Germany is now building coal power plants almost as fast as the Chinese.)
None of that spending would help the economy grow. If you tax the private sector into oblivion, it does not matter if it can ship its products on four-lane highways or six-lane highways. There won’t be anyone there to buy their products in the first place. It matters even less if the energy that manufacturers would use is from sometimes-producing wind turbines or sometimes-producing solar panels. If the energy is too expensive to make manufacturing competitive, nobody is going to want to buy it in the first place.
Europe does not need more government. It does not need more government-first austerity either. It needs limited-government austerity. And soon. Otherwise, it is basically over for Europe as a first-world continent.
Here is the first in a four-part series on austerity, its theory, its application and its consequences:
The United States of America is a wonderful country to live in. Contrary to the laments of most of my conservative and libertarian friends, this country is still among the most free and opportunity-friendly places on Earth. Americans are strong individuals, they are friendly yet have a lot of integrity, they celebrate winners and have compassion for losers. There is less racism here than in Europe, and we are more prosperous than they are, and deep down in the fertile soil of Middle America, the roots of freedom and democracy stand firm even when the political storms rage viciously through the legislative hallways of our country. Our constitution, while twisted and tweaked and bent and stretched, is still working.
Our deeply rooted sense of individuality – as opposed to individualism – and freedom is currently helping America through one of the toughest periods in her almost 250-year long history. This country is the last place on Earth where totalitarianism would take over. But our freedom, prosperity and peace are at least to some degree dependent on what is going on in the rest of the world.
This is why in the 20th century the United States established itself as a global power. Throughout most of that time, Europe has been a major scene for our foreign policy and military engagements. A big reason is that Europe has long been, and still is, a central stage for the fight against totalitarianism.
With the rise of totalitarian nationalism in primarily Germany, Italy and Spain in the 1920s and ’30s, Europe became the world’s most important battle ground between freedom and tyranny. Freedom won the war, but once the bullets had stopped flying a more polished version of the values that drove Hitler, Mussolini and Franco to power began setting roots in Western Europe. The idea of collectivism, which is in the DNA of Naziism and fascism, is also prevalent deep into the segments of European politics that are generally considered democratic. The notion that government can and should shape a nation, socially, culturally and economically, has taken seemingly more palatable forms than the swastika.
Today, nationalists no longer use the sense of patriotism as their first and foremost voter recruitment tool. The new gateway to nationalism is the welfare state.
More on that in a moment. First, a quick look back at how nationalism – and totalitarianism – is once again able to rise to political prominence in Europe.
In 1960, in one of the most revealing books on the subject, titled Beyond the Welfare State, Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal explains how the idea of central economic planning without political dictatorship has conquered Western Europe and is slowly but relentlessly replacing Capitalism as the prevailing economic model. The welfare state, for short, would soon spread its intellectual tentacles across the Atlantic and peacefully defeat the American free-enterprise system. Myrdal was partly right: with considerable help from John Kenneth Galbraith’s Economics and the Public Purpose and The New Industrial State the American left made a major effort during the 1960s and ’70s to establish the European notion of collectivism and indicative economic planning as the new normal for the New World.
They never quite succeeded. The Obama administration represents the last effort of the collectivist left to “fundamentally remake” America (as Obama put it during his campaign). But while the welfare state is finally reaching its peak as a socio-economic model here in the United States, the Europeans are holding on to it for dear life. The entire fiscal struggle during the Great Recession has been about saving Europe’s ailing welfare states with every means possible – even at the expense of years of declining GDP, at the cost of 30, 40, 50 and even 60 percent youth unemployment. Ill-designed austerity, motivated not by a desire to shrink big government but to save it, has taken more from people in the form of higher taxes and given less back.
Instead of conceding that the welfare state is a lost cause; instead of repealing the welfare state and giving economic freedom a chance; the political leadership in Europe has doubled – no, tripled – down in their defense of collectivism, high taxes, income redistribution, entitlements, socialized health care and deep, stifling regulations of the labor market.
In countries with the biggest, most intrusive governments this has resulted in a dangerous political backlash. When voters feel betrayed by the government that promised to take care of them cradle to grave, and there is no alternative there presenting a case for economic freedom, voters turn their back on the established political institutions that gave them the welfare state. Those institutions also happen to be parliamentary democracy. Feeling that parliamentary democracy has let them down and left them out to dry, both financially and politically, large groups of voters are now turning to another form of collectivist parties.
The modern totalitarians.
When the European welfare state swept through Western Europe in the ’50s and ’60s its collectivist principles appealed to people whose cultural background was a straight line from late Medieval collectivism through undemocratic monarchies to the nationalist movements of the early 20th century. Europe may have been the birthplace of the concept of the individual, but the continent never quite unleashed what they had discovered. Unlike America, the roots of Europe’s political culture are still firmly in the notions of nationalism, collectivism and – almost for a century now – the welfare state. It was a smooth transition for Europe to go from nationalism to the welfare state: instead of being part of an ethnically, racially or culturally defined group along nation-state lines, the Europeans became part of a mildly Marxist dichotomy between taxpayers and entitlement recipients.
While the technical difference is considerable, the cultural difference is minor. The individual shrinks and crawls in under the group banner, hoping that the group will care for him. By giving legislative power to political parties that promise more entitlements, Europe’s voters have reaffirmed and reinforced the collectivist principles that guide the welfare state.
Those collectivist principles, however, are easily transferrable, from the welfare state onto another collectivist vehicle. Now that the welfare state has proven, beyond a shred of a doubt, that it can no longer keep its entitlement promises, Europe’s voters have begun listening to the old nationalist tunes again.
The difference between today’s nationalists and those that ultimately paved the way for Naziism and fascism after World War I, is that today they know how to use the welfare state to appeal to people. Every nationalist party in Europe, from the Danish People’s Party and the Swedish Democrats to the far uglier Front National in France, Fidesz and Jobbik in Hungary and Golden Dawn in Greece, promises to preserve the welfare state in one form or another. They have learned to capitalize on people’s frustration with the failing welfare state. But instead of rightly pointing out that the statist economic model is flawed, the modern nationalists – and especially the totalitarians among them – have projected the blame onto centrist, social-democrat and liberal political parties. Ultimately, this blame falls on parliamentary democracy itself.
So far, only the outer rim of the modern nationalist surge has pointed finger squarely at parliamentary democracy. However, as Golden Dawn, Jobbik and similar parties gain ground, antipathy toward the parliamentary system will grow. France will be one of the key battle grounds between nationalism and parliamentarism: if Le Pen follows in the early footsteps of her father it is entirely possible that her rise to the presidency in 2017 could mark the beginning of the end of De Gaulle’s Fifth Republic. If the radicals in her movement set the tone, the new France that would emerge – the Sixth Republic – could become a catalyst for a new, broad nationalist surge across Europe.
There are already movements around the continent hard at work to create a fascist “Gross-Europa”. They are probably not going to gain more than marginal political influence, at least not in the near future. But it is important to remember that a decade ago, the idea of a President Le Pen in France was laughable. Furthermore, the idea of a resurrection of European communism was ridiculed. I know, because I warned about it in an article in Front Page Magazine back in 2006 and got more than a few sarcastic comments from more established “thinkers”. Even a cursory look at the results in the EU Parliament election in late May shows how frighteningly right I was back then.
And I did not even consider that nationalism would be a competing force. But with two competing, and growing, totalitarian movements now procreating in Europe’s political landscape, the continent is facing a dark future. Independently, these movements will reinforce Europe’s collectivist culture and cling to its dying welfare state for as long as they can, and then some. Most of all, they are going to use it to entice people into crossing the line, from parliamentary democracy into a totalitarian political system Europe has supposedly left behind it.
Using the welfare state as an economic gateway drug, the modern totalitarians are going to try to reshape the continent that, for a century, has been America’s most costly foreign-policy problem. Given that both the nationalists and the communists now rising to political prominence are negative, in some cases outright hostile, toward America, that foreign-policy problem may soon come back knocking on the doors of the U.S. State Department – and the Pentagon.
In a great article in the Wall Street Journal, former vice president Dick Cheney and his daughter, former senatorial candidate Liz Cheney, explain how Obama’s failures on the foreign-policy front are transforming the Middle East into a new major headache for America. They are correct, but it is crucial for America’s future that our foreign policy does not overlook the radical transformation taking place in Europe right now.
The political establishment in the EU is grasping for some positive news in the election fallout. It is still too early to say definitively what the consequences will be, but my first conclusion, namely that Euroepan democracy was dealt a blow, still stands. The anti-democratic flanks of the political spectrum gained ground at the cost of centrist parties. The one silver lining is that democratic, Euro-skeptic parties like the UKIP did very well and will increase their influence on the European scene.
As I also pointed out in my last article, the election has put Europe at a fork in the road: either the continent makes a turn toward a better future, with less EU-level government and a general move in the libertarian direction, or the anti-democratic collectivists – in the shape of communists, Nazis and aggressive nationalists – will gradually gain more power and push the EU in a very dangerous direction. If the EU political establishment is smart, they will extend an olive branch to democratic Euro skeptics like Nigel Farage from UKIP and Morten Messerschmidt from the Danish People’s Party.
Based on post-election media reports thus far, it is by no means certain that the Eurocracy will make the right choice here. As an example, consider this report from EUBusiness.com:
European Union leaders agreed Tuesday to take a fresh look at the bloc’s policy priorities, after a stinging vote setback across Europe that saw dramatic gains by radical anti-establishment parties. Meeting for a post-mortem summit in the wake of the dismal European Parliament election results, the bloc’s 28 national leaders gave European Council chairman Herman Van Rompuy a mandate to fine-tune policy goals on issues from jobs to energy. … He said that now that Europe was emerging from economic crisis, there was a need for an agenda of growth, jobs and competitiveness. He also stressed that “a strong response” was needed to the climate change challenge and “a push” towards energy union and to lessen energy dependency.
Not a word about the need to reconsider the growth of the Eurocracy. Not a word of self reflection over what the EU has become. To be blunt, if this is how the mainstream parties in the European Parliament are going to respond to last week’s elections, the chickens are going to come home to roost, marching in lines behind either a hammer and a sickle, or a swastika.
It is still unlikely that this will happen, but it definitely cannot be ruled out. The question is if the Europhile parties in the Parliament have it in them to slow down the EU project and be more reflective than Herman van Rompuy. The EU Business again:
Projections give the conserv ative European People’s Party (EPP) 213 seats out of 751, with the Socialists on 190 and the Liberals 64. That will give the centre-right, centre-left and Liberals a solid working majority. … The anti-EU camp will have about 140 seats though analysts say it will be difficult for the disparate groups to operate in a coherent fashion.
It would be foolish of the Europhile parties to use this arithmetic as a basis for their policies. Nevertheless, there is a great risk that this is how they choose to read the voter mandate from last week’s elections. A story from Euractiv concurs:
The Eurosceptic election victory, notably in France, the UK and Denmark, should not drastically affect the work of the European Parliament. With 140 MEPs in the next legislature, Eurosceptic parties will still represent a minority out of the 751 MEPs in the EP. “Their influence will be low. They will only have a slow-down effect on proceedings,” said Henri Weber, an outgoing French MEP. “They will obstruct more, and turn up to sessions with their national flags, as did Nigel Farage’s UKIP party during the last mandate,” he continued. Law-making should only be marginally affected by the increase of Eurosceptic MEPs, as most plenary session voting in Strasbourg is taken by absolute majority. With 751 MEPs from 28 EU member states, the Eurosceptic vote cannot reach the absolute majority alone (376 seats). “The National Front is definitely not the dominant political party in Europe. The party that came out on top in these elections was the EPP, followed by the PES and ALDE” stated Nathalie Griesbeck, French centrist MEP.
Yes, but they lost seats right and left. However, if there is one positive touch to this, it is that the Eurocracy will probably move ahead with some items that could actually help the European economy. One of those items is the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP, which has strong support in the EU political leadership as well as in the European business community. Back in February, EU Observer reported:
The ‘honeymoon phase’ of talks aimed at brokering a landmark EU-US trade deal are over, business leaders have warned. Speaking at a meeting of business leaders in Athens to coincide with a meeting of EU trade ministers on Friday (28 February), Markus Behyrer, the director general of lobby group BusinessEurope, led calls for EU leaders and the business community to tighten their communications strategies to retain public support. “The honeymoon phase of the negotiations appears to be over,” said Behyrer. “Now the phase when negotiators will need our support and encouragement…we will have to prove that this is not a race to the bottom but a race to the top.” At a press conference later Karel de Gucht commented that “the debate should be based upon the facts – not just speculation and fear-mongering.”
There was one caveat in that article:
Finland’s Europe minister Alexander Stubb warned that “selling” the talks would be “a really tough case”. “We are grappling with people who are anti-free trade, anti-American, and anti-globalisation,” he said.
The anti-free trade, anti-American, anti-globalization crowd made big inroads into the European parliament this election. They will do what they can to stop or delay the TTIP. Fortunately, as the Daily Telegraph reports, the determination was strong as late as last week, on both sides of the Atlantic, to bring the trade negotiations to completion:
US and EU trade representatives have had a “productive” fifth round of talks, but hard work lies ahead, US trade representative Michael Froman says. “We’ve moved from discussing a conceptual framework to defining specific ideas for addressing the majority of the negotiating areas,” Froman said as the talks ended. He said there was “a lot of work ahead” but “steady progress” was being made and there was now “a firm understanding of the key issues that need to be resolved”. Froman’s chief negotiator in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Dan Mullaney, called the week’s talks “challenging”. Completing the world’s largest free trade agreement “will require a lot of creativity and a lot of persistence,” he told reporters. Ignacio Garcia-Bercero, chief negotiator for the European Union, underlined that the overall goal was “highly ambitious” but that progress had been made through “intensive” discussions this week on labour, environment and sustainable development issues. The US and European Union aim to expand what is already the world’s biggest trade relationship by dismantling regulatory barriers that force companies to produce different products for the US and European markets.
This would be a huge boost for trans-Atlantic trade and have a cost-lowering effect on many consumer and industry products. Let’s hope the Eurocrats prioritize this as they move forward, but that they also learn to listen to Euro-skeptics when it comes to the relations between the EU and its member states. If they don’t, the authoritarian flanks of the European political scene will continue to grow at the expense of democracy, political stability – and economic freedom and prosperity.
Anyone who has had even a minimum of experience trying to balance a check book knows that if you first define the food you want to buy, the car you want to drive, the house you want to live in and the clothes you want to wear, and then look for a job to pay for those expenses, you are very likely going to end up with an acute overdraft on your checking account. Anyone who has ever run a business knows that if you hire the number of people you want, buy the inventories you want and hire the facilities you like, and then start trying to sell products to get the revenue that those costs require, you are almost certainly going to go belly-up.
The welfare state does not confine itself to the same realities as private citizens do. Its MO is the exact opposite of how the real world works. It makes promises to a select group of citizens and then forces another group of citizens to pay for those promises – regardless of whether or not the latter group can afford it. The promises are made in the form of “defined benefits”, in other words government first decides to give away a certain amount of money (welfare checks, housing subsidies, food stamps) or specific services (education, health care, child care) and then, once the package of entitlements is in place, starts looking for a way to pay for it.
This upside-down approach sets up the welfare state for some big trouble. It also has terrible long-term consequences for all of us. When the entitlement programs go online they reduce work incentives among large layers of the population. So do the taxes created to pay for those entitlement programs. Fewer people work to feed themselves fully, while fewer people work fully out to build wealth or create businesses.
So long as the welfare state is small, focusing its entitlement programs only on those who are really needy, there is only a marginal loss of economic activity. The lack of a visible macroeconomic price tag on this small welfare state encourages government expansionists to pursue more entitlement programs with higher taxes.
At some point, though, the growing welfare state inhibits enough productive economic activity to create serious problems with growth and prosperity. What was initially a tolerable balance between tax revenues and entitlement spending soon becomes an unsustainable imbalance: slower economic growth leaves more people entitled to support from the welfare state; slower economic growth produces fewer decent-paying jobs, leaving more people entitled to support from the welfare state; more support from the welfare state discourage people from pursuing decent-paying jobs, eventually reducing supply of such jobs.
To complete the imbalance: slower economic growth reduces the stream of tax revenue needed to pay for the ever-growing output from the welfare state’s entitlement programs. A structural imbalance emerges where government expansionists pursue ever higher taxes and the private sector quietly winds down its operations, or moves them overseas.
Latin America has seen plenty of this, with Argentina as the absolutely best example. In the period from circa 1920 through the 1950s, Argentina was a flourishing economy with among the highest standard of living in the world. There were years when Argentina attracted more immigrants from Europe than the United States. Then the welfare state came and the rest is history.
A history that the current Pope should have learned. He was, after all, cardinal of Buenos Aires before rising to the Holy See. Unfortunately, learning from history is apparently not a prerequisite for rising through the ranks of the Catholic church. The Associated Press reports:
Pope Francis called Friday [May 9] for governments to redistribute wealth to the poor in a new spirit of generosity to help curb the “economy of exclusion” that is taking hold today. Francis made the appeal during a speech to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the heads of major U.N. agencies who met in Rome this week. Latin America’s first pope has frequently lashed out at the injustices of capitalism and the global economic system that excludes so much of humanity, though his predecessors have voiced similar concerns.
What is injust about an economic system where every individual can find work at his own best ability, or start a business, build a career on nothing but his own merits? What is unjust about an economic system that does not come with long bread lines, where consumers can make independent choices what they want to eat, where they want to live, how much they want to save for their own future? What is unjust about an economic system where people can give to charitable causes regardless of their faith, and regardless of the faith of the recipient? What is unjust about an economic system where people can choose their own doctor, what school their children should attend and how much they want to save up for their own retirement?
What is wrong with an economic system where you get to keep the proceeds of your hard work, where the farmer who spends that extra hour out in the field can put better food on his children’s dinner plates? What is wrong with an economic system where the poor do not have to be poor for the rest of their lives, but can work their way up from despair to independent wealth?
Back to the Associated Press story:
On Friday, Francis called for the United Nations to promote a “worldwide ethical mobilization” of solidarity with the poor in a new spirit of generosity. He said a more equal form of economic progress can be had through “the legitimate redistribution of economic benefits by the state, as well as indispensable cooperation between the private sector and civil society.” Francis voiced a similar message to the World Economic Forum in January and in his apostolic exhortation “The Joy of the Gospel.” That document, which denounced trickle-down economic theories as unproven and naive, provoked accusations in the U.S. that he was a Marxist.
My mother grew up poor. My grandfather, who had six years of school to lean on, worked as a logger and built a small farm big enough to provide the very, very basics of what his family needed. They set aside money so they could move to a mining town where my grandfather hauled iron ore a thousand feet under ground while grandmother raised seven children to be strong, independent, proud and ambitious. My mother once explained what set their family aside from many other families living under the same conditions:
“We didn’t have time to complain about how poor we were. We were too busy doing our homework.”
So there is your priority. Either you invest in yourself, pursue opportunities and build your life – or you sit at your kitchen table day and night complaining about how your neighbor drives a better car than you do.
The Associated Press again:
Francis urged the U.N. to promote development goals that attack the root causes of poverty and hunger, protect the environment and ensure dignified labor for all. “Specifically, this involves challenging all forms of injustices and resisting the economy of exclusion, the throwaway culture and the culture of death which nowadays sadly risk becoming passively accepted,” he said.
And of course the Pope does not spell out what he believes are the root causes of poverty and hunger. If he pursued those “root causes” he would have to address the fact that the poorest nations on Earth are also run by corrupt, ruthlessly selfish dictators who steal from their own people. Or does the Pope see no difference between the government systems of, on the one hand, the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Australia and Japan and, on the other hand, the Democratic Republic of Congo, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Somalia and the Central African Republic?